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ARTICLE 
BALANCING THE COMPETING FUNCTIONS OF 
PATENT POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS 
Michael Xun Liu* 
 
Since the 1980s, the United States Patent and Trademark Office has amended or revoked 
patents through post-grant proceedings.  These are quasi-judicial proceedings that are often used 
to resolve patent disputes.  But aside from adjudicating private disputes, post-grant proceedings 
also aim to protect the public against invalid patents, create more certainty in patent rights, and 
bolster confidence in the patent system.  These functions are often described as “examinational” 
because they rely on the PTO’s ability to reexamine the validity of issued patents. 
This Article explores the extent to which post-grant proceedings under the America Invents 
Act (AIA) perform examinational functions.  Although post-grant proceedings have proven 
effective at adjudicating patent validity during litigation,  they have been less effective at fulfilling 
their examinational functions.  In particular, several provisions of the AIA undermine the 
patent office’s ability to protect the public from invalid patents, while others discourage early 
resolution of patent validity and scope.  To assess the potential benefits and drawbacks of reform, 
this Article also looks at the European Patent Office’s experience with post-grant proceedings.  
Despite their problems, European proceedings have been fairly successful at screening patents 
and improving patent quality.  As such, they may offer useful insights for the U.S. patent 
system. 
  
 
*J.D. 2014, University of Michigan Law School.  The views expressed in this Article are the 
author’s alone, and do not represent the views of any private or government institutions. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
During Supreme Court arguments in Oil States Energy Services v. Green’s Energy 
Group, Chief Justice Roberts asked whether counsel believed that “[i]f you want 
the sweet of having a patent, you’ve got to take the bitter that the government 
might reevaluate it at some subsequent point.”1  Setting aside any constitutional 
problems with this logic, it seems reasonable to assume that if the Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”) decides whether to grant patents, then the agency 
should also correct its own mistakes by amending or revoking improperly issued 
patents.  Nevertheless, the task of reviewing issued patents has been traditionally 
left to district courts, and the PTO has only been able to revoke improperly 
granted patents through post-grant proceedings in the past few decades.2  How 
the PTO conducts post-grant proceedings, and whether its procedures are 
consistent with underlying policy goals, remains a contentious topic. 
Since the America Invents Act (AIA) became law, the PTO’s Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (Board) has started playing a much larger role in reevaluating 
patents.3  Through AIA Reviews, the Board now decides validity in a significant 
number of patent disputes, thus taking on a task that was previously reserved 
almost exclusively for district courts.4  Viewing post-grant proceedings as only a 
substitute for litigation, however, overlooks important policy goals.  Unlike 
district court litigation, post-grant proceedings should do more than adjudicate 
private disputes—they are also intended to protect the public from overbroad 
patents and promote certainty in patent rights.5  These functions have been 
described as “examinational” because they rely on the PTO’s ability to reexamine 
the validity of issued patents.6  Substantively and procedurally, there are 
differences between an adjudicative proceeding and one that is more 
examinational.  For example, a proceeding that protects the public from 
overbroad patents should give the PTO wide discretion to revoke patents that 
 
 1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 31–32, Oil States Energy Serv., LLC v. Green’s Energy Grp., 
LLC, No. 16-712 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017), https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/ 
argument_transcripts/2017/16-712_879d.pdf.  
 2 Kenneth R. Adamo, Patent Reexamination, 58 CHI. KENT L. REV. 59, 59 (1981). 
 3 The AIA created three types of post-grant proceedings: post-grant review, inter partes 
review, and covered business method review.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).  This Article refers to them collectively as AIA Reviews. 
 4 By the end of 2017, the PTO received over 7,900 petitions for AIA reviews, 1912 of 
which have reached a decision on the merits.  PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD, TRIAL 
STATISTICS 11 (Dec. 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Trial_ 
Statistics_2017-12-31.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2018) [hereinafter 2017 TRIAL STATISTICS]. 
 5 Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 2131, 2143–44 (2016). 
 6 Id. 
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were improperly granted.7  By contrast, a proceeding that is solely adjudicative is 
more likely to limit PTO’s role to assessing the parties’ arguments, much like a 
district court judge or jury.8   
Compared to pre-AIA proceedings like ex parte reexaminations, AIA Reviews 
are meant to be more adjudicative than examinational.9  Arguments are made to 
a panel of administrative patent judges instead of patent examiners, and the 
proceedings allow for limited discovery and an oral hearing.10  In other respects, 
however, AIA Reviews remain somewhat examinational.  For example, the PTO 
does not give a presumption of validity for challenged claims.11  And “[p]arties 
that initiate the proceeding need not have a concrete stake in the outcome; 
indeed, they may lack constitutional standing.”12  Because of these mixed 
characteristics, AIA Reviews are typically described as “hybrid” proceedings with 
both adjudicative and examinational elements.13   
Whether AIA Reviews actually achieve the policy goals of a “hybrid” 
proceeding, however, remains debatable.  In theory, AIA Reviews advance policy 
goals consistent with patent examination, such as protecting the public from 
overbroad claims and promoting certainty in patent rights.14  But in practice, the 
Board’s role in AIA Reviews tends to be more limited.15  The Board does not 
independently evaluate validity, and relies almost exclusively on the parties’ 
arguments.16  Although patent owners have the right to amend their claims, few 
succeeded in doing so within the first few years of the AIA.17  So instead of 
narrowing claims to keep “patent monopolies . . . within their legitimate 
scope,”18 the Board’s decision is usually limited to affirming or invalidating 
challenged patents, just like district court decisions.  Moreover, the majority of 
AIA Reviews are conducted alongside litigation involving the same patents, and 
the district court proceedings are often stayed pending the Board’s decision.19  
 
 7 Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward A Viable Administrative Revocation System for 
U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 13–14 (1997). 
 8 Id. at 36. 
 9 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144. 
 10 35 U.S.C. §§ 6, 316. 
 11 35 U.S.C. § 316 (establishing preponderance of the evidence standard for invalidity). 
 12 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 See infra Part III.A. 
 16 Id. 
 17 UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD 
MOTION TO AMEND STUDY 4 (Apr. 30, 2016), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ 
files/documents/2016-04-30%20P.T.A.B.%20MTA%20study.pdf.  
 18 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2134-2144. 
 19 Saurabh Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court 
Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 69 (2016) (“[A]bout 86.8 % of IPR or CBM challenged 
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Therefore, one commonly held view is that AIA Reviews essentially supplant 
district court validity litigation with an administrative proceeding that is more 
favorable to challengers.20   
Accordingly, the reality of AIA Reviews can seem inconsistent with its policy 
goals.  This Article examines the source of this disconnect, and identifies two 
issues that undermine the examinational function of AIA Reviews.  First, the 
Board’s ability to independently evaluate patentability is limited, so it relies 
almost exclusively on the petitioners’ arguments to revoke claims.21  From the 
standpoint of protecting the public against invalid patents, this becomes 
problematic if the patentee settles with the petitioner or amends the claims in a 
way that eliminates the risk of infringement for the petitioner.  In these 
circumstances, the petitioner may not have any reason to argue for invalidity.  
This issue was partly why the PTO initially decided to require patent owners to 
prove the patentability of proposed amended claims in AIA Reviews.22  By doing 
so, the Board tried to protect the public from invalid patents by forcing patent 
owners to show that its new claims are patentable, since the Board cannot 
examine the claims itself.23   
Second, the AIA’s estoppel rules discourage early resolution of patent 
validity.  Post-grant proceedings were created in part because improperly granted 
patents have negative social and economic consequences even if they are not 
litigated.24  Thus, it was important to provide a means of challenging invalid 
patents before they are asserted in court.25  Likewise, early resolution of validity 
is also beneficial because that is “when patent holders have invested the least 
resources and the opportunity for third parties to change course in the market is 
 
patents are also being litigated in the federal courts.”); Andrew J. Gray & Ehsun Forghany, 
Avoiding a Patent War on Two Fronts, in 2017 PTAB DIGEST: THE LATEST TRENDS AND 
DEVELOPMENTS IN POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS 26 (2017), https://www.morganlewis.com/-
/media/files/publication/report/ptab-post-grant-proceedings_fin_screen.ashx. 
 20 Peter J. Pitts, ‘Patent Death Squads’ vs. Innovation, WALL STR. J. (June 10, 2015), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/patent-death-squads-vs-innovation-
1433978591?mg=prod/accounts-wsj; Stacy Lewis & Tom Irving, Very Few Appreciated Just How 
Bad AIA Inter Partes Reviews (IPRs) Would Be for Patent Owners, Although IPR Denials Have Been, 
for Patent Owners, A Glimmer of Hope, 11 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 28, 36 (2015). 
 21 Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal 
Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 18750, 18754 (Apr. 1, 2016) (Final Rule) [hereinafter 2016 Rule 
Amendments]. 
 22 Id. (explaining how “the Office has set forth rules for motions to amend that account for 
the absence of an independent examination by the Office”). 
 23 Id. 
 24 Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. 
REV. 101, 104 (2006); Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Does the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents: Evidence from a Quasi-Experiment, 67 STAN. L. REV. 
613, 620 (2015). 
 25 Leslie, supra note 24; Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24. 
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greatest.”26  The AIA, however, does little to encourage early challenges to patent 
validity.  Instead, the statute imposes broad estoppel for post-grant review 
(“PGR”) petitions, which pushes parties to wait and challenge validity through 
IPR, and often only after litigation becomes imminent.27  So even though an 
important advantage of post-grant proceedings is the ability to resolve patent 
rights before litigation, the reality is that most AIA Reviews are directed to 
patents that are being adjudicated in district court anyways.28 
The U.S. patent system is not alone in trying to balance competing policy 
visions of post-grant proceedings.  Like the PTO, the European Patent Office 
(“EPO”) also provides a “first window” to challenge the validity of recently 
issued patents.29  Since the 1980s, third-parties in Europe could file an opposition 
proceeding to challenge patent validity within nine-months of issuance.30  These 
proceedings have their own problems,  including their tendency to drag on for 
years.31  Nevertheless, EPO opposition proceedings provide a useful contrast 
with AIA Reviews.  Around five percent of all European Patents are opposed, 
and this procedure has become an important tool for challenging validity, 
particularly with respect to economically important patents.32  Although it is 
neither feasible nor desirable to make AIA Reviews the same as EPO 
oppositions, the PTO could adopt certain features like narrowing estoppel for 
PGR to encourage earlier challenges to patent validity, and giving the PTO more 
authority to independently examine claims, at least in PGR.  Doing so should 
allow the PTO to better carry out the examinational functions of AIA Reviews. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Section I reviews the adjudicative and 
examinational aspects of post-grant proceedings, and describes how such 
proceedings have evolved in the U.S.  Section II looks at how certain features of 
the AIA undermines its examinational function.  It explores why the PTO is 
constrained to the petitioner’s invalidity arguments and how, in some 
circumstances, this limitation can undermine the policy goals of AIA Reviews.  
This section also looks at how the AIA’s estoppel rules effectively discourage 
 
 26 Stephen G. Kunin & Anton W. Fetting, The Metamorphosis of Inter Partes Reexamination, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 976 (2004). 
 27 See infra Part III.B. 
 28 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 69. 
 29 Filip De Corte et al., AIA Post-Grant Review & European Oppositions: Will They Work in 
Tandem, or Rather Pass Like Ships in the Night?, 14 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 93, 98–112 (2012). 
 30 Id. 
 31 Jonathan Radcliffe, The European Patent Office Introduces a “Go-Faster” Opposition 
Process, Reed Smith LLP (June 21, 2016), https://www.reedsmith.com/en/perspectives/ 
2016/06/the-european-patent-office-introduces-a-gofaster-o. 
 32 Bronwyn H. Hall & Dietmar Harhoff, Post-Grant Reviews in the U.S. Patent System-Design 
Choices and Expected Impact, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 1006 (2004); Stuart Graham et al., 
Post-Issue Patent Quality Control: A Comparative Study of US Patent Re-Examinations and European 
Patent Oppositions, (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8807, 2002). 
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petitions within the nine-month “first window” period for PGR.  Section III 
compares AIA Reviews to the EPO’s opposition proceedings.  Although 
opposition proceedings may seem similar to PGR, the former is generally 
considered more effective at screening out dubious patents early.33  Accordingly, 
this section examines whether the PTO should emulate certain features of 
opposition proceedings. 
II.  COMPETING FUNCTIONS OF POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS 
Broadly speaking, allowing the PTO to revoke or amend issued patents serves 
two purposes.34  The first is to fix defects in the PTO’s original examination, and 
is often described as “examinational” or “curative.”35  At its core, this aspect of 
post-grant proceedings aims to protect the public from overbroad or invalid 
patents, which can skew market competition and deter innovation.36  In theory, 
giving the PTO a chance to correct its errors also bolsters certainty in patent 
rights and the presumption of validity generally.37  The second function is to 
provide an alternative to district court validity litigation.  Instead of trying to fix 
or improve patents for the public benefit, this aspect of administrative patent 
review tries to resolve disputes between private parties more efficiently and 
accurately.38 
The legal literature has long recognized these two functions of post-grant 
proceedings.  For instance, Professor Mark Janis describes how administrative 
review could be a curative mechanism “through which the public could compel 
the PTO to correct its own errors, even in the absence of any infringement 
proceedings.”39  Not only would this eliminate bad patents, but “courts reviewing 
those same patents in the course of infringement litigation would have greater 
assurance that the PTO had conducted a proper prior art search and had applied 
the results of that search thoughtfully.”40  Professor Janis distinguished this 
aspect of administrative review from “litigation avoidance,” which aimed to 
“provide a specialized tribunal to resolve disputes in lieu of traditional court 
adjudication.”41   
The distinction between the examinational and adjudicative aspects of post-
grant proceedings also has practical consequences.  For example, restricting 
 
 33 See infra Part IV. 
 34 Janis, supra note 7, at 23. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. 
 38 Mark D. Janis, Inter Partes Patent Reexamination, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J.  481, 483–84 (2000). 
 39 Janis, supra note 7, at 13–14. 
 40 Id. at 15. 
 41 Id. at 36. 
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invalidity arguments to those based on documentary prior art would “seem 
inconsistent with the goal of formulating an administrative alternative to validity 
litigation” but “fully consistent with the goal of providing a curative 
mechanism.”42  Accused infringers in district court litigation can conduct wide-
ranging discovery into prior commercial sales or public use of the patented 
invention to invalidate a patent.43  By contrast, patent examiners cannot 
“thoroughly investigate sources of nondocumentary prior art, such as public uses 
and offers for sale.  Thus, original examinations are often de facto limited to 
documentary sources of prior art.”44  So to the extent that post-grant proceedings 
are a redo of the initial examination instead of an alternative to litigation, it seems 
reasonable to also limit post-grant proceedings to documentary prior art. 
The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have cited the examinational role of 
the PTO to justify broader standards for claim construction and lower standards 
for proving invalidity.45  For instance, the Federal Circuit held that the PTO is 
not required to apply a presumption of validity for issued patents during 
reexaminations, which is one form of post-grant proceeding, because no such 
presumption is afforded to claims during patent prosecution.46  In so concluding, 
the Court emphasized that the main purpose of reexaminations was to “increase 
the reliability of the PTO’s action in issuing a patent by reexamination of patents 
thought ‘doubtful.’”47  Reexaminations might replace some aspects of litigation 
by “free[ing] the court from any need to consider prior art,” but this was merely 
an “auxiliary function” and not the main purpose of such proceedings.48  More 
recently, in Cuozzo, the Supreme Court upheld the PTO’s use of the broadest 
reasonable interpretation for construing claims in IPRs, which is a standard from 
patent examination.49  Although the Court recognized that the AIA made post-
grant proceedings more adjudicative, the Court ultimately found that “nothing 
convinces us that . . . Congress wanted to change its basic purposes, namely, to 
reexamine an earlier agency decision.”50 
 
 42 Id. at 56. 
 43 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 27–34 (providing various discovery tools for federal civil 
litigation). 
 44 Id. 
 45 In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming broadest reasonable 
construction for ex parte reexaminations); In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985) 
(holding that statutory presumption of validity for patent claims is inapplicable to 
reexaminations); Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144 (affirming PTO’s use of broadest reasonable 
construction in inter partes review). 
 46 In re Etter, 756 F.2d at 857. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144. 
 50 Id. 
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Thus, the balance between the examinational and adjudicative functions 
impacts how the Board conducts its review and the legal standards it can apply.  
The remainder of this Section takes a closer look at these respective functions.  
It also provides an overview of administrative patent review in the United States, 
and traces its evolution from a purely examinational proceeding to the current 
“hybrid” model under the AIA.   
A.  THE EXAMINATIONAL FUNCTION 
The traditional justification for post-grant proceedings is that it allows the 
PTO to revisit its decision to grant a patent and correct any errors during 
examination.51  The social and economic costs of improperly issued patents are 
well-documented.  Invalid patents “can result in supracompetitive pricing and 
diminished quantity . . . without providing the commensurate benefits” of 
disclosing an invention.”52  They can be a tool for extracting nuisance 
settlements,53 as well as to stifle innovation by monopolizing foundational 
technologies.54  Even where invalid patents are never enforced, they can still have 
an anticompetitive effect.55  Unenforced patents deter competitors from entering 
the market, drive investors and customers away from potentially infringing 
products, and force companies to expend resources on design-around 
solutions.56  Thus, invalid patents lead to welfare loss and skew competitive 
markets even if no infringement suit is ever filed.57  Given the negative 
consequences of the PTO’s errors, one goal of administrative patent review is to 
give the PTO a means to correct its mistakes and protect the public from 
overbroad or invalid patents.  In doing so, the agency can revoke or narrow 
improperly granted claims to cut off their impact on markets.58   
This justification for post-grant proceedings, however, assumes the patent 
system should protect against invalid patents by revisiting issued patents instead 
of reducing mistakes during the initial examination.  Given the cost of error, one 
could argue that it would make sense to devote more resources to examining 
patent applications in the first instance, instead of revisiting patents that have 
already issued.  Indeed, studies have shown that patent examiners often do not 
have enough time or resources to fully investigate whether a patent application 
 
 51 Etter, 756 F.2d at 857; Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144. 
 52 Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 620. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Leslie, supra note 24, at 104; Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 
U.S. 66, 72 (2012). 
 55 Leslie, supra note 24, at 104. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Joe Matal, A Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED. 
CIRCUIT B.J. 539, 601 (2012). 
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is truly inventive.59  Likewise, some have observed that the PTO incentivizes 
patent examiners to grant more patents instead of vigorously opposing dubious 
applications.60  These studies suggest that devoting more resources to the initial 
examination may lead to substantial improvements in overall patent quality.  
Moreover, there are clear benefits to avoiding errors during examination in the 
first place instead of going back to invalidate patents after they have already been 
granted.  An issued patent creates reliance interests in the patentee, investors, 
and customers that are undermined if the patent is later revoked.61 
And yet, although it may seem counterintuitive, spending more time and 
money examining patent applications may be a poor allocation of social 
resources.  That is because most patents are not economically significant, and the 
increased cost of scrutinizing every patent application in greater detail likely 
outweighs the marginal benefit from such examination.62  As Professor Mark 
Lemley points out, 
[T]he overwhelming majority of patents are never litigated or 
even licensed.  Because so few patents are ever asserted against 
a competitor, it is much cheaper for society to make detailed 
validity determinations in those few cases than to invest 
additional resources examining patents that will never be heard 
from again.63 
The PTO, however, is not well positioned to identify which patents are 
important and which are worthless.64  Indeed, “the prevailing view of patent 
examination is that it proceeds under a veil of rational ignorance, where patent 
examiners seek information about patentability using only finite resources that 
do not exceed the value of the information itself.”65  By contrast, industry 
competitors in the same field of technology should—by hypothesis— have 
better knowledge about which patents are valuable.  In this sense, post-grant 
 
 59 Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, Is the Time Allocated to Review Patent 
Applications Inducing Examiners to Grant Invalid Patents?: Evidence from Micro-Level Application Data, 
99 REV. ECON. & STAT. no. 3, 4 (2014); Leslie, supra note 24, at 107; Susan W. Graf, Comment, 
Improving Patent Quality Through Identification of Relevant Prior Art: Approaches to Increase Information 
Flow to the Patent Office, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 495, 502 (2007). 
 60 Id. 
 61 Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 108 (2011) (noting that heightened 
standard of proof on invalidity protects the patentee’s reliance interests). 
 62 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1497 (2001).  
 63 Id. 
 64 Saurabh Vishnubhakat, The Youngest Patent Validity Proceeding: Evaluating Post-Grant Review, 
24 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 333, 337 (2016). 
 65 Id. 
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proceedings are a means of outsourcing to private parties the task of identifying 
which patents should receive additional scrutiny.   
Related to the goal of protecting the public from invalid patents, allowing the 
PTO to revisit its initial decisions should also create more certainty in patent 
validity and scope, as well as bolster confidence in issued patents.66  Uncertainty 
about validity and scope may “cause the patent holder to under-invest in the 
technology, reduce investment by potential competitors in competing technical 
advances, and lead to costly litigation after both the patent holder and potential 
competitors have sunk sizable investments.”67   
In principle, post-grant proceedings help resolve uncertainty in three ways.  
First, administrative review “fixes” patents that are overbroad or otherwise 
defective by amending the claims.  This allows the patentee to correct errors in 
the patent before subjecting it to litigation, where such errors could invalidate 
the patent altogether.68  To illustrate, suppose that a patent owner becomes aware 
of a potentially invalidating prior art reference after its patent has already issued.  
The patentee could ask the PTO to review the newly discovered prior art in a 
post-grant proceeding like ex parte reexamination.69  If the PTO determines the 
patent is valid, this would presumably reduce the likelihood that a court will later 
invalidate the patent based on the same reference.70  On the other hand, if the 
prior art reference indeed poses a validity problem, then the patentee can narrow 
the claims to an appropriate scope.71  Either way, the patent emerges from 
administrative review stronger and more likely to survive a validity challenge in 
district court.72 
The second way this process helps resolve uncertainty is that post-grant 
proceedings provide an “early window” to resolve validity questions before 
litigation.  Courts cannot opine on patent validity unless there is an ongoing or 
imminent lawsuit, since the Constitution limits federal courts to resolving 
“[c]ases and [c]ontroversies.”73  So even if a company believes its competitor’s 
patent is invalid, it must invest in a potentially infringing product and face the 
risk that a court might ultimately disagree with its invalidity position.74  Coupled 
 
 66 Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 991. 
 67 Id. 
 68 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307 (1980). 
 69 35 U.S.C. §§ 302–305. 
 70 H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 4 (1980); Adamo, supra note 3, at 63 n.26. 
 71 35 U.S.C. § 305 (“In any reexamination proceeding under this chapter, the patent owner 
will be permitted to propose any amendment to his patent and a new claim or claims thereto, 
in order to distinguish the invention as claimed from the prior art cited.”) 
 72 Adamo, supra note 2, at 78. 
 73 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007). 
 74 See Sandoz Inc. v. Amgen Inc., 773 F.3d 1274, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (explaining that case 
or controversy requirement requires courts to assess whether the declaratory judgment 
plaintiff has “presented a case of sufficient ‘immediacy and reality’ ”); Matal, supra note 58, at 
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with the unpredictable nature of patent litigation, being unable to challenge a 
patent before litigation will undoubtedly deter some companies from investing 
in a new product or service altogether.75 
Unlike district courts, administrative agencies are not constrained by the 
Constitution’s case or controversy clause.76  The PTO can resolve validity 
disputes even if the petitioner would not have standing in federal court.77  This 
allows the PTO to resolve any questions about validity early in the life of a patent, 
before the patentee or its competitors have invested significant resources in 
developing or commercializing a patented product.  This feature of 
administrative patent review also allows groups who would not have Article III 
standing to challenge dubious patents.78  Public interest organizations like the 
Electronic Frontier Foundation can file petitions against issued patents at the 
PTO, whereas they would not have standing to do so in court.79  Likewise, 
industry groups such as Unified Patents also frequently file IPR petitions on 
behalf of their members.80  This allows the PTO to review patents that impact 
consumers or small businesses, even though such entities may not otherwise 
have the resources to individually challenge patents in court.81 
Third, some argue the existence of administrative patent review can bolster 
the presumption of validity generally.82  By allowing the PTO to revisit issued 
patents, the system should make it easier to challenge weaker patents and increase 
public confidence in patents that remain in effect.83  This makes sense in theory, 
 
601 (2012) (“[A] competitor cannot challenge a patent in litigation before the competitor 
incurs the costs and risks of developing and marketing a product.”). 
 75 Leslie, supra note 24, at 113. 
 76 Sierra Club v. E.P.A., 292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“An administrative 
agency . . . is not subject to Article III of the Constitution of the United States.” (quoting 
Pfizer, Inc. v. Shalala, 182 F.3d 975, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1999))). 
 77 Pers. Audio, LLC v. Elec. Frontier Found., 867 F.3d 1246, 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2017). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 IPR: Not Just for Litigants, RPX, (Feb. 21, 2017), https://www.rpxcorp.com/2017/ 
02/21/ipr-not-just-for-litigants/ (describing how non-litigants are now some of the most 
frequent filers of IPR petitioners). 
 81 Joe Mullin, Unified Patents Files Legal Challenges Against Top Three Patent Trolls of 2016, 
ARSTECHNICA (July 27, 2016, 2:39 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2016/07/patent-defense-group-seeks-to-knock-out-top-three-trolls-of-2015/; Annie 
Dike, “Goliath” Troll Under P.T.A.B. Review, NAT’L L. REV. (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/goliath-troll-under-P.T.A.B.-review. 
 82 Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 601 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (describing how 
reexaminations would revive “United States industry’s competitive vitality by restoring 
confidence in the validity of patents issued by the PTO.”). 
 83 Id.; James W. Beard, A Better Carrot Incentivizing Patent Reexamination, 1 HASTINGS SCI. & 
TECH. L.J. 169, 177–78 (2009) (“By increasing the ease with which weak patents could be 
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but the verdict is still out on whether administrative review realistically bolsters 
confidence in patent rights.  Some have suggested that expanding administrative 
patent reviews through the AIA may have actually harmed public confidence in 
patents.84  For instance, one industry representative testified to the Senate 
Judiciary Committee  that AIA Reviews make revoking patent rights too easy 
and create the perception that the PTO is biased against patent owners.85  It is 
also conceivable that, by invalidating many issued patents, the PTO is signaling 
that its initial examination is highly unreliable. 
B.  THE ADJUDICATIVE FUNCTION 
The second function for post-grant proceedings is adjudicative.  That is, post-
grant proceedings allow the PTO to serve as an alternative forum for resolving 
private disputes about patents.86  Compared to its examinational functions, this 
aspect of post-grant proceedings is less intuitive.  At first glance, it seems 
redundant to provide a separate proceeding to litigate patent validity, given that 
district courts are entirely capable of performing this role.  There are, however, 
important reasons why the patent system benefits from separate administrative 
patent reviews that operate in parallel with district courts.  Having the PTO 
decide validity may be more accurate and efficient.87  It is also cheaper.88  The 
resources dedicated to litigation can have a detrimental effect on business 
operations, particularly for smaller companies.89  Moreover, the high cost of 
litigation encourages nuisance settlements even where the patent is invalid or the 
infringement case is meritless.90   
To start, an agency staffed by technical experts may be better qualified to 
adjudicate patent validity than judges or juries.  Disputes about patent validity 
 
challenged and invalidated, those patents that remained in effect could be afforded a stronger 
presumption of validity . . . .”) . 
 84 S. 1137, the “Patent Act” – Finding Effective Solutions to Address Abusive Patent 
Practices to S. Comm. on Judiciary (May 7, 2015) (statement of Kevin H. Rhodes), 
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05-07-15%20Rhodes%20Testimony.pdf 
(contending that the “perception of imbalance is undermining public and investor confidence 
in patent rights and the patent system”). 
 85 Id. 
 86 Janis, supra note 7, at 36. 
 87 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143–44 (describing how AIA Reviews were meant to be quick and 
inexpensive compared to district court litigation). 
 88 Id. 
 89 Michael Liu, Joinder under the AIA: Shifting Non-Practicing Entity Patent Assertions away from 
Small Businesses, 19 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 489, 495–96 (2013). 
 90 Jesse Greenspan, Counting the True Cost of a Nuisance Settlement, LAW360 (Aug. 28, 2008, 
12:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/67683/counting-the-true-cost-of-a-nuisance-
settlement. 
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often involve highly technical issues.91  In the United States, a patent-eligible idea 
can be claimed if it is novel, non-obvious, and adequately disclosed in the patent 
specification, among other requirements.92  Assessing these questions requires 
knowledge of the relevant field and at least some understanding of the technical 
issues involved in the patent.93  Aside from the technical nature of patent validity 
itself, the objective standard for assessing questions like novelty or the adequacy 
of disclosure also varies based on the field of invention.94  Questions like whether 
a patent is novel are not evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable person—
the standard that district court judges typically apply.95  Instead, they are assessed 
through the perspective of a person of ordinary skill in the relevant technical 
field, which varies based on the invention.96   
Various studies have identified problems with submitting questions to juries 
and judges with no technical expertise.97  One study found that juries are often 
unwilling to second-guess the PTO’s decision to grant the patent.98  Yet another 
concluded juries are more likely to decide patent cases on an all-or-nothing basis, 
and may even be biased by which party first brought the lawsuit.99  Others have 
also noted deficiencies in district court decision-making in patent disputes.100  
For example, empirical studies suggest that district court claim constructions are 
frequently reversed, with one paper estimating that the Federal Circuit vacated 
one-third of the district court claim constructions that were appealed.101  Another 
study found that half of district court claim constructions appealed to the Federal 
Circuit were at least partially vacated or reversed in some form.102 
 
 91 Arti K. Rai, Patent Institutions: Shifting Interactions Between Legal Actors, 1 RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (forthcoming) (draft at 1). 
 92 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–103, 112. 
 93 See generally Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 94 Id. at 1313. 
 95 Kimberly A. Moore, Are District Court Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. 
& TECH. 1, 6 (2001). 
 96 Id. 
 97 Jennifer F. Miller, Should Juries Hear Complex Patent Cases?, DUKE L. & TECH. REV., Apr. 
2, 2004, ¶ 32; Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide if Patents are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV. 1673, 
1674 (2013); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases -An Empirical Peek Inside the Black 
Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 409 (2000); Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 95, at 30. 
 98 Lemley, supra note 97, at 1674. 
 99 Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases, supra note 97. 
 100 See generally Moore, District Court Judges, supra note 95, at 30. 
 101 Id. at 12. 
 102 Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, A Study of the Role and Impact of Special Masters in Patent 
Cases, FEDERAL  JUDICIAL  CENTER, 12 (2009), http://www.courtappointedmasters.org/ 
sites/default/files/specmapa.pdf.  It is important to note that, even if the Federal Circuit finds 
error in nearly half of all district court claim constructions, that does not mean that district 
court judges are wrong half the time.  Only a subset of district court decisions is appealed.  
And even among the appealed cases, the appellant chooses which arguments to present before 
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Because of the highly technical nature of the adjudicative facts involved with 
patent validity, there is a need to “deploy[ ] greater expertise and resources at the 
administrative and trial court levels.”103  Providing post-grant proceedings at the 
PTO is one way to do so, as it allows parties to submit factual disputes to 
technically trained judges.  At the PTO, the Board consists of administrative 
patent judges with “competent legal knowledge and scientific ability.”104  These 
judges are divided into sections based on technical focus.105  Although it is 
difficult to say for certain, there is reason to believe the Board’s specialized nature 
may be yielding more accurate results on technical questions.  Qualitatively, the 
Board seems comfortable grappling with complex technical issues in its 
opinions.106  Around 75% of Board opinions that are appealed to the Federal 
Circuit are ultimately affirmed.107  The Board is also required to explain its 
opinions and provide cogent rationales for either affirming or revoking claims.108  
This makes the Board’s decision more transparent, and its errors easier to 
identify, than the metaphorical black box of a jury verdict. 
Post-grant proceedings also provide a cheaper way to invalidate patents than 
district court litigation.  Although costs for patent litigation have fallen in recent 
years, it still remains expensive to litigate in district court.109  For patent 
infringement cases with $1 million to $10 million at stake, the median cost is $1.7 
million dollars.110  Where the amount at risk exceeds $25 million, the median cost 
of litigation is around $ 3.3 million.111  The cost of litigation creates problems 
beyond sky-high legal bills for companies.  Because it can cost millions just to 
take a case through discovery, there is a strong incentive for defendants to settle 
 
the Federal Circuit.  Therefore, appellants are more likely to appeal claim construction if the 
claim term is difficult to construe, or where the district court decision is poorly-reasoned. 
 103 Rai, supra note 91, at 1. 
 104 35 U.S.C. § 6. 
 105 ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE PATENT TRIAL AND 
APPEAL BOARD, USPTO (2015), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/ files/ documents/ 
Organizational%20Structure% 20of%20the%20Board%20May%2012%202015.pdf.  
 106 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for its Money: Challenging Patents 
in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 235, 261 (2015). 
 107 Michael Joffre et al., PTAB at 5: Part 3- Fed. Circ. Statistics, Law360 (Sept. 13, 2017, 1:44 
PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/961586/ptab-at-5-part-3-fed-circ-statistics. 
 108 Rovalma, S.A. v. Bohler-Edelstahl GmbH & Co. KG, 856 F.3d 1019, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 
2017) (holding that the Board’s obviousness “analysis should be made explicit” and noting the 
court has “repeatedly insisted on such explanations in reviewing the adequacy of the Board’s 
analysis—both as a matter of obviousness law and as a matter of administrative law”). 
 109 Malathi Nayak, Cost of Patent Infringement Litigation Falling Sharply, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 10, 
2017), https://www.bna.com/cost-patent-infringement-n73014463011/. 
 110 Id. 
 111 Id. 
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with a patentee for less than the cost of litigation.112  This encourages meritless 
lawsuits to extract nuisance settlements.113  High litigation costs also 
disproportionally affect small to medium sized businesses.114  Relative to their 
overall budget, legal fees exact a higher toll from small companies than larger 
ones.115  Likewise, devoting resources to patent litigation detracts more 
significantly from the routine business operations of smaller companies.116   
Providing a cheaper alternative to district court litigation should make it 
harder to extract nuisance settlements.  Instead of having to go through discovery 
and summary judgment to invalidate an overbroad patent, the accused infringer 
has the option of asking the PTO to cancel the patent administratively.117  
Litigation costs for post-grant proceedings have, in fact, been significantly lower 
than district court litigation.118  The cost of a typical IPR ranges from $ 300–400 
thousand, which is a fraction of the cost of discovery in district court for many 
litigants.119 
C.  THE “HYBRID” APPROACH UNDER THE AMERICA INVENTS ACT 
In the U.S., post-grant proceedings started as an examinational procedure, 
but steadily transitioned towards a more adjudicative model.  In 1980, Congress 
passed the Patent and Trademark Laws Act, which created the first post-grant 
proceeding in the form of ex parte reexamination.120  As its name would suggest, 
reexamination allows the PTO to re-examine issued claims and evaluate whether 
they are valid in view of new prior art or arguments.121  Initially, Congress was 
more concerned about bolstering certainty in issued patent than problems 
associated with high litigation costs incurred by defendants or nuisance 
 
 112 See Jesse Greenspan, Counting the True Cost of a Nuisance Settlement, LAW360 (Aug. 28, 2008, 
12:00 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/67683/counting-the-true-cost-of-a-nuisance-
settlement. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Liu, supra note 89. 
 115 Id. 
 116 Id. 
 117 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143–44 (2016) (summarizing legislative history of how AIA 
Reviews were meant to be “a quick, inexpensive, and reliable alternative to district court 
litigation”). 
 118 AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW ASSOCIATION, 2015 REPORT OF THE 
ECONOMIC SURVEY 43 (2015), https://www.aipla.org/learningcenter/library/books/ 
econsurvey/2015EconomicSurvey/Pages/default.aspx. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Pub. L. No. 96-517, H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307(I), at 3 (1980). 
 121 Etter, 756 F.2d at 857 (“In a very real sense, the intent underlying reexamination is to 
‘start over’ in the PTO with respect to the limited examination areas involved . . . as they would 
have been considered if they had been originally examined . . . .”). 
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settlements.122  So rather than basing its procedure on litigation, reexaminations 
were designed to mimic the PTO’s initial examination.123  Accordingly, ex parte 
reexaminations were conducted between the patent examiner and the patentee, 
with no participation rights for the requestor.124  Inter partes reexamination were 
later introduced to give limited participation rights to third-party requestors.125  
Nevertheless, these proceedings were still conducted before patent examiners, 
with no discovery or oral hearings.126 
By the mid-2000s, policy concerns shifted away from bolstering patent 
validity and towards perceived abuses of the patent system.127  A common 
perception was that the PTO granted too many questionable patents that 
disclosed nothing innovative, preempted basic concepts, and hampered 
innovation.128  This was especially noticeable in the computer and software fields, 
which experienced a steep rise in patent activity in the 1990s, due in part to the 
“dot-com” boom.129  Public attention also increasingly focused on businesses 
that did not sell products, but instead licensed and litigated patents to generate 
revenue.130  These were called non-practicing entities or, more derisively, patent 
trolls.131  When the dot-com bubble collapsed and many technology companies 
failed, their patent portfolios occasionally wound up at non-practicing entities 
 
 122 Supra note 120 (describing how a new patent reexamination procedure was necessary to 
“permit the owner of a patent to have the validity of his patent tested in the Patent Office” 
before litigation). 
 123 Adamo, supra note 2, at 63–65. 
 124 Id. at 65-67. 
 125 American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 (1999); amended by 
the Intellectual Property and High Technical Amendments Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273 
(2002). 
 126 Abbott Lab. v. Cordis Corp., 710 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (“The PTO’s 
regulations for inter partes reexaminations make no provision for either party to take 
depositions.”). 
 127 Mark Lemley & Bhaven Sampat, Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 
182 (2008) (“A growing chorus of voices is sounding a common refrain: the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) is issuing far too many bad patents.  Look almost anywhere and you 
can find entertaining examples of silly patents that surely should not have issued.”); Carl 
Shapiro, Patent System Reform: Economic Analysis and Critique, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1017, 1018 
(2004) (“The chorus of complaints about the U.S. patent system has grown louder in recent 
years . . . . Complaints regarding the patent system typically allege that the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) issues many questionable patents.”). 
 128 Id. 
 129 Keith N. Hylton, Patent Uncertainty: Toward a Framework with Applications, 96 B.U. L. REV. 
1117, 1125–27 (describing factors that led to the increase in software patents). 
 130 John F. Luman & Christopher L. Dodson, No Longer a Myth, the Emergence of the Patent 
Troll: Stifling Innovation, Increasing Litigation, and Extorting Billions, 18 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., 
no. 5, 1 (2006). 
 131 Id. 
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that aggressively monetized the patents through licensing and litigation.132  As a 
result, there was a significant increase in patent litigation from the mid-1990s 
onwards, particularly in the computer and software industry.133   
In 2011, Congress passed the America Invents Act (AIA) partly to clamp 
down on perceived abuses of the patent system.134  Along with other significant 
changes to the patent laws, the AIA pushed post-grant proceedings decidedly 
towards an adjudicative model.135  In place of inter partes reexamination, the AIA 
created IPR, PGR, and transitional covered business method review (CBMR).136  
PGR was designed to create a “first-window” to challenge patents shortly after 
they issue.137  Petitioners can raise a broad array of invalidity arguments, but must 
file their challenge no later than “9 months after the date of the grant of the 
patent.”138  By contrast, IPR is available for the entire life of the patent but is 
limited to invalidity arguments based on prior art publications or patents.139  
Finally, CBMR is only available for business method patents and will be phased 
out by 2020 unless Congress decides to extend the program.140   
The overall procedure for IPR, PGR, and CBMR is similar.  Each starts with 
a petition challenging an issued patent.141  The Board then issues an institution 
decision, which is a preliminary determination as to whether the petition raises a 
reasonable likelihood of invalidity for one or more claims of the challenged 
patent.142  If review is instituted, the parties make arguments to a panel of three 
administrative patent judges, and the proceedings allow for limited discovery and 
an oral hearing.143  At this time, the patent owner can also file a motion to amend 
the claims.144  Within one year of institution, the Board issues a final written 
 
 132 David G. Barker, Troll Or No Troll? Policing Patent Usage with An Open Post-Grant Review, 4 
DUKE L. & TECH. REV., 1, 1–2 (2005) (describing the sale of Commerce One’s patent portfolio 
to a non-practicing entity during a bankruptcy auction). 
 133 Hylton, supra note 129, at 1125–26; James Bessen, The Patent Troll Crisis is Really a Software 
Patent Crisis, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch 
/wp/2013/09/03/the-patent-troll-crisis-is-really-a-software-patent-
crisis/?utm_term=.8909c5855d14. 
 134 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284, 329-331 (2011). 
 135 H.R. REP. NO. 112–98, pt. 1, at 46–47 (2011); Cuozzo, at 2143. 
 136 Supra note 134, at §§ 6, 18. 
 137 Matal, supra note 58, at 601, 609–10. 
 138 35 U.S.C. § 321(c). 
 139 Id. § 311. 
 140 Supra note 134, at § 18. 
 141 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 312, 322. 
 142 See id. §§ 314, 324. 
 143 Id. § 6; 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.51–42.53, 42.70. 
 144 35 U.S.C. § 316(d). 
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decision on the patentability of the challenged claims and any newly proposed 
claims.145   
Although the AIA made administrative patent reviews more adjudicative, the 
new proceedings also retained some examinational characteristics, most notably 
the ability to amend the patent to avoid cited prior art.146  Petitioners do not need 
Article III standing, and they are only required to prove invalidity by a 
preponderance of the evidence.147  By contrast, accused infringers in district 
court litigation must prove invalidity by clear and convincing evidence.148  
Through its regulatory authority, the PTO also imported key legal standards from 
reexaminations, including the broadest reasonable interpretation for claim 
construction.149  This is different than the legal standard in district courts, which 
apply the ordinary meaning of the claim as it would be understood by someone 
skilled in the technical field of the invention.150  In theory, the broadest 
reasonable construction covers more prior art and makes AIA reviews more 
favorable for petitioners.151  By being over inclusive, this standard is intended to 
force applicants to draft more precise claims, which in turn protects the public 
from overbroad or vague patents.152   
Various patent owners, however, argued that the PTO’s decision to use 
examinational legal standards like the broadest reasonable interpretation is 
inconsistent with the adjudicative model for AIA Reviews.153  They reasoned 
that, if AIA Reviews were meant to replace district court litigation, then the PTO 
should use the same standards as district courts to construe claims.154  The 
Supreme Court rejected this argument in Cuozzo.155  In doing so, the Court 
recognized the adjudicative aspect of AIA Reviews but ultimately characterized 
them as hybrid proceedings with both examination and litigation-like 
 
 145 35 U.S.C. §§ 318, 328. 
 146 Id. § 316(d). 
 147 Id. §§ 311, 316(e). 
 148 Microsoft Corp. v. I4I Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011). 
 149 37 C.F.R. § 42.100(b) (establishing broadest reasonable construction standard for IPR); 
Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1572 (describing use of broadest reasonable interpretation for ex parte 
reexaminations). 
 150 Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1313. 
 151 Lewis & Irving, supra note 20, at 59. 
 152 Yamamoto, 740 F.2d at 1571 (explaining that the broadest reasonable interpretation 
“serves the public interest by reducing the possibility that claims, finally allowed, will be given 
broader scope than is justified”); In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 322 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“An essential 
purpose of patent examination is to fashion claims that are precise, clear, correct, and 
unambiguous.  Only in this way can uncertainties of claim scope be removed, as much as 
possible, during the administrative process.”). 
 153 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2143. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 2144. 
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characteristics.156  The Court explained that “nothing convinces us 
that . . . Congress wanted to change its basic purposes, namely, to reexamine an 
earlier agency decision.”157  And the Court also observed that “in addition to 
helping resolve concrete patent-related disputes among parties, IPRs protect the 
public’s ‘paramount interest in seeing that patent monopolies . . . are kept within 
their legitimate scope.’ ”158  Because of their hybrid nature, the PTO is entitled 
to apply examinational standards like the broadest reasonable construction.159 
Recently, the PTO has revisited its position regarding the broadest reasonable 
interpretation.160 Under Director Andrei Iancu, the PTO has announced 
proposed rulemaking that would “replace the broadest reasonable interpretation 
(“BRI”) standard for construing unexpired patent claims and proposed claims in 
these trial proceedings with a standard that is the same as the standard applied in 
federal district courts.”161 The PTO’s notice of proposed rulemaking relied 
heavily on the adjudicative function of post-grant proceedings.162  For instance, 
the PTO stressed the need to “[m]inimize differences between claim 
construction standards used in the various fora could lead to greater uniformity 
and predictability of the patent grant.”163  And, the PTO cited Congress’s intent 
“to provide ‘quick and cost-effective alternatives’ to litigation in the courts.”164  
In doing so, the PTO’s proposed rule likely signals a wider shift towards an 
adjudicative model for post-grant proceedings under Director Iancu.   
III.  LIMITS OF THE EXAMINATIONAL FUNCTION UNDER THE AIA 
There is no doubt that Congress intended to make post-grant proceedings 
under the AIA more adjudicative than previous proceedings like ex parte 
reexaminations.165  The House Judiciary Committee Report states that the AIA 
“converts inter partes reexamination from an examinational to an adjudicative 
proceeding.”166  And during debates in the Senate, Senator Kyl described how 
 
 156 Id. 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 
(1945)). 
 159 Id. 
 160 Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial Proceedings 
Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 21221 (proposed May 9, 2018) (to be 
codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42). 
 161 Id. at 21221. 
 162 Id. at 21225. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. at 21223. 
 165 Id. 
 166 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 46–8 (2011); see also Matal, supra note 58, at 620. 
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converting reexaminations to an adjudicative proceeding represents an 
“important structural change… in which the petitioner, rather than the [PTO] 
bears the burden of showing unpatentability.”167  But as the Supreme Court also 
correctly observed in Cuozzo, the structure of AIA Reviews continue to reflect 
examinational policy goals in other respects.168  For instance, the burden of proof 
for invalidity is preponderance of the evidence, which is lower than the clear and 
convincing evidence standard that district courts apply.169  The AIA also 
guarantees patent owners the opportunity to amend challenged claims instead of 
having their patents revoked altogether.170   
These provisions have led courts to recognize that AIA Reviews are intended, 
at least in part, to correct mistakes from examination and strengthen existing 
patent rights.171  But does the reality of AIA Reviews actually reflect these goals?  
In other words, do AIA Reviews narrow patents to “their legitimate scope” and 
protect the public from dubious patents172— or are these proceedings doing the 
same thing as district court validity litigation?  If AIA Reviews only function as 
an alternative litigation forum for all practical purposes, then using legal 
standards from examination seems hard to justify.   
Presently, AIA Reviews look more like litigation than anything that could be 
fairly described as examination.  The majority of AIA Reviews are conducted 
alongside district court litigation involving the same patents, which are frequently 
stayed pending the PTO’s decision.173  The Board does not examine patent 
claims, but instead relies on petitioners to raise invalidity arguments.174  If the 
petitioner drops out, the Board usually does not continue reviewing the 
challenged patent even if it already found a reasonable likelihood that the claims 
 
 167 Matal, supra note 58, at 620–1 (quoting 157 CONG. REC. S1376 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) 
(statement of Sen. Kyl)). 
 168 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144. 
 169 35 U.S.C. § 316(e). 
 170 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144. 
 171 Id.; Aqua Prod., Inc. v. Matal, 872 F.3d 1290, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The goal underlying 
the AIA is twofold: (1) eliminating patents that foster abusive litigation; and (2) affirming and 
strengthening viable patents.”). 
 172 Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144 (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. 
Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945)). 
 173 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 69; Jonathan Stroud, Linda Thayer & Jeffrey C. 
Totten, Stay Awhile: The Evolving Law of District Court Stays in Light of Inter Partes Review, Post-
Grant Review, and Covered Business Method Post-Grant Review, 11 BUFF. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 226, 238 
(2015) (“Current research shows that to date, approximately 58% of requests for stays across 
all district courts have been granted outright, 6% partially granted, 29% denied, and 7% 
pending.”). 
 174 2016 Rule Amendments, supra note 21, at 18754 (“The Board does not conduct a prior 
art search to evaluate the patentability of the proposed substitute claims, and any such 
requirement would be impractical given the statutory structure of AIA proceedings.”). 
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are invalid.175  Moreover, because the PTO required patentees to prove the 
validity of proposed amended claims, very few patentees successfully amended 
their claims even though the AIA guarantees an opportunity to do so.176  
Although the Federal Circuit recently overturned the PTO’s standard on motions 
to amend, the practical impact of the court’s decision remains unclear.177   
This section looks at why AIA Reviews are predominantly adjudicative in 
practice, and identifies two aspects of these proceedings that undermine their 
examinational function.  First, the Board cannot independently examine the 
validity of challenged claims, and must rely almost exclusively on the petitioner’s 
arguments.178  Although Congress deliberately placed the onus of proving 
invalidity on petitioners, this feature of AIA Reviews can be problematic if the 
parties settle or the patent owner amends the claims.179  In either case, the 
petitioner may not have reason to argue for invalidation, and the Board cannot 
properly guard against invalid patents without evaluating the claims 
independently.180 
Second, the AIA fails to adequately incentivize early resolution of patent 
validity.  The opportunity to resolve patent validity early is one of the key benefits 
of administrative patent review.181  It allows the PTO to revoke invalid patents 
to cut off their competition distorting effects, or, if the claims are confirmed, 
give patent owners greater certainty to invest in patented products.182  But instead 
of encouraging early validity challenges, the AIA estoppel provisions discourage 
parties from filing PGR petitions, which are available within nine months of 
patent issuance.183  And by doing so, the statutory scheme pushes parties towards 
IPRs, which are available throughout the life of the patent, and often used only 
when litigation is imminent.184 
 
 175 See 35 U.S.C. § 317 (“An inter partes review instituted under this chapter shall be 
terminated with respect to any petitioner upon the joint request of the petitioner and the patent 
owner, unless the Office has decided the merits of the proceeding before the request for 
termination is filed.”). 
 176 Aqua Prod., 872 F.3d at 1300. 
 177 Id. at 1296. 
 178 See infra Part IV.A. 
 179 See infra Part III.A. 
 180 Id. 
 181 Id. 
 182 See supra Part II.A 
 183 See infra Part III.B. 
 184 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 69 (“[A]bout 86.7 % of IP- or CBM-challenged 
patents are also being litigated in the federal courts”); Pedram Sameni, Patexia Chart 44: Eighty 
Percent of IPR Filings are for Defensive Purposes, PATEXIA (Nov. 8, 2017), https:// 
www.patexia.com/feed/patexia-chart-44-80-percent-of-ipr-filings-are-for-defensive-
purposes-20171107. 
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A.  LACK OF INDEPENDENT EXAMINATION 
First, consider whether the Board should have an independent role in 
evaluating the validity of a challenged patent, or if it should be limited to 
assessing the relative strengths and weaknesses of the parties’ arguments.  If 
administrative patent review is primarily defined by its adjudicative function, then 
the Board has no need to conduct an independent examination of challenged 
claims.  Instead, it should act as a neutral adjudicator like a judge or jury.185  And 
in that role, the Board should not make independent fact-findings or raise new 
arguments based on the prior art.  On the other hand, because revoking invalid 
patents serves the public interest, one could argue the PTO should have authority 
to supplement the petitioner’s arguments based on the Board’s own 
understanding of the prior art, or even invalidate claims on grounds that may not 
have been raised by the petitioner at all.  For examinational proceeding like ex 
parte reexaminations, the PTO can review and cancel an issued patent sua sponte 
if the agency believes there was a substantial new question of patentability.186   
Under the AIA, however, the Board can do little to cancel or narrow claims 
if the petitioner stops participating or drops out.  If both parties ask to terminate 
the proceeding, the Board shall do so “unless the Office has decided the merits 
of the proceeding before the request for termination is filed.”187  Thus, the Board 
will stop an AIA Review upon the parties’ request even after it has already 
determined there is a reasonable likelihood that the challenged patent is 
invalid.188  By contrast, if the requestor in a reexamination asks for the 
proceeding to be terminated, the examiner is still supposed to “make a thorough 
study of the patent and a thorough investigation of the available prior art relating 
to the subject matter of the claimed invention.”189  The AIA also limits the PTO’s 
ability to raise arguments that were not presented by the petitioner.  For instance, 
the AIA states that petitioners have the burden of proving the unpatentability of 
each challenged claim and must explain each ground of invalidity with 
particularity.190   
Moreover, as a practical matter, the Board’s ability to raise new arguments or 
introduce evidence is limited by the structure of AIA Reviews and the Board’s 
 
 185 See, e.g., Janis, supra note 7, at 13–14. 
 186 35 U.S.C. § 304. 
 187 35 U.S.C. § 317. 
 188 The Board must determine whether there is a reasonable likelihood of unpatentability 
before it can institute review.  Around 22% of instituted reviews are terminated by settlement 
in 2016–2017.  In 2014, the percentage of cases settled post-institution was as high as 40%.  
2017 TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 10. 
 189 In re AT & T Intellectual Prop. II, L.P., 856 F.3d 991, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (affirming 
Board’s decision to initiate reexamination over the original requestor’s objections). 
 190 35 U.S.C. § 312(a)(3). 
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institutional capacity.191  Timing-wise, the statutory deadline to issue a final 
written decision limits the Board’s ability to conduct an independent prior art 
review.192  While patent reexaminations can last for several years, AIA reviews 
must be completed within one year of institution.193  And unlike in 
reexamination, where the PTO and the patent owner can engage in back-and-
forth arguments, the Board generally takes a back-seat during AIA reviews.  
Instead of issuing “office actions” that set forth grounds for invalidity, the Board 
only issues two substantive decisions on patentability: an institution decision and 
a final written decision.194  The institution decision is based on an incomplete 
record.195  On the other hand, because the final written decision occurs at the 
end of the proceedings, new rationales for invalidity can deprive the patent 
owner of adequate notice and opportunity to respond.196  So while the Board has 
some leeway to base its final decision on its own analysis, more substantial 
departures from the petitioner’s invalidity positions pose a due process 
problem.197   
From an institutional standpoint, AIA Reviews are also conducted by an 
adjudicative body rather than one that is examinational.  AIA Reviews start and 
end before a panel of administrative patent judges.198  Unlike patent examiners, 
administrative patent judges do not search for prior art or examine claims.199  By 
contrast, reexaminations are conducted by patent examiners, who can 
independently evaluate the patent and prior art even if the requestor is no longer 
participating.200  Reexaminations only proceed to the Board after the examiner 
has already reached a decision to uphold or invalidate the patent.201  In short, 
 
 191 2016 Rule Amendments, supra note 21, at 18754. 
 192 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11). 
 193 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 58 (“The reexaminations themselves took an average 
of 39.5 months, and then had to be appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and 
Interferences.”). 
 194 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.108, 42.108. 
 195 See id. § 42.108(c) (describing how Board must base its institution decision on the petition 
and patent owner preliminary response). 
 196 SAS Inst., Inc. v. ComplementSoft, LLC., 825 F.3d 1341, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (vacating 
Board decision because it adopted a new claim construction in the final written decision 
without providing adequate notice to the patent owner). 
 197 Compare Belden Inc. v. Berk-Tek LLC, 805 F.3d 1064, 1074 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (holding that 
“the Board was entitled to rely on its own reading” of the prior art to find the claim obvious), 
with SAS, 825 F.3d at 1351. 
 198 35 U.S.C. § 6. 
 199 2016 Rule Amendments, supra note 21, at 18754. 
 200 AT&T, 856 F.3d at 994 (affirming Board’s decision to initiate reexamination over the 
original requestor’s objections). 
 201 35 U.S.C.A. § 315 (2002) (superseded by Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 
112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011)). 
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because of its procedural and institutional constraints, the Board performs few 
tasks that could be considered “examinational.”   
Nevertheless, given that Congress made a deliberate policy choice to move 
from an examinational to an adjudicative model for post-grant proceedings, it 
makes sense for the Board to serve as a neutral adjudicator instead of revoking 
patents based on its own view of the prior art.  And in many cases, the Board’s 
inability to rely on its own examination of the prior art likely has no practical 
significance.  As discussed in Part III, one reason for having post-grant 
proceedings is to outsource the prior art search and analysis to interested private 
parties.202  Most petitioners have strong incentives to find the most relevant prior 
art and present vigorous arguments to invalidate challenged patents.  Therefore, 
the PTO can usually protect the public from dubious patents by acting as a 
neutral adjudicator and assessing the petitioner’s arguments.  Things only start 
to break down, however, where the petitioner identifies a potentially invalid 
patent but is no longer incentivized to continue arguing for invalidity.  This can 
occur after settlement or when the patentee tries to amend the claims. 
Settlement is the first situation where limits on the Board’s ability to rely on 
its own view of the prior art becomes problematic.  The AIA allows petitioners 
to settle with the patent owner and voluntarily move to terminate the AIA 
Review.203  Over the past two years, approximately 14% of AIA Reviews are 
settled before the Board institutes review, and 22% of instituted reviews also 
ended in settlement.204  There are strong policy reasons for promoting 
settlement, which conserves private and agency resources.205  And it would surely 
undermine any motivation to settle if the parties believe the PTO will cancel the 
patent regardless.   
There are, however, social costs to settlement as well, particularly with respect 
to patent validity disputes.  Allowing parties to terminate an AIA review deprives 
the public of the Board’s opinion on validity.  This allows some improperly 
granted patents to survive review even if they would otherwise have been 
invalidated absent settlement.206  Further, settlement also allows the patentee to 
preserve a potentially invalid patent by granting a license to one company, but 
leveraging the same patent against subsequent competitors.  Indeed, the Second 
Circuit has lamented the “troubling dynamic” in which “[t]he less sound the 
patent . . . , the more a rule permitting settlement is likely to benefit the patent 
holder by allowing it to retain the patent.”207  The court noted that “[s]o long as 
the law encourages settlement, weak patent cases will likely be settled even 
 
 202 See supra Part III.A. 
 203 35 U.S.C. § 317. 
 204 2017 TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 10. 
 205 Foster v. Hallco Mfg. Co., 947 F.2d 469, 477 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 206 In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 211 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 207 Id. 
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though such settlements will inevitably protect patent monopolies that are, 
perhaps, undeserved.”208  Likewise, Professor Joseph Miller explains how patent 
invalidity judgments can be viewed as a public good because it clears the way for 
competitors to enter the market, even if those other competitors were not 
involved in the litigation.209  However, this creates a free-rider problem for patent 
challengers because their competitors do not have to expend resources to 
invalidate the patent, but still receive the same benefits from invalidation.210  This 
dynamic encourages challengers to settle instead of invalidating the patent, which 
in turn allows patent owners to continue asserting patents that may have been 
improperly granted.211 
The problems associated with patent settlements occur in both district court 
litigation and post-grant proceedings.  Unlike district courts, however, the Board 
is expressly charged with protecting the public against dubious patents and 
promoting certainty in patent rights—at least to the extent AIA Reviews function 
as “hybrid proceedings.”212  But unless the Board has the capacity to 
independently evaluate challenged claims, it  cannot realistically carry out this 
public protection function once the petitioner drops out.  This allows the patent 
owner to preserve invalid patents through settlement, even at the PTO.  And as 
the Second Circuit observed, patent owners are more motivated to settle 
invalidity challenges against patents that are “less sound.”213   
Nor do settlements in AIA Reviews further the goal of creating more 
certainty in patent rights, which depends on information about patent validity 
and scope.  Settlements prevent such information from being produced and 
disseminated.214  In some cases, settlement can even be a deliberate “technique 
for preserving uncertainty regarding the patent rights at issue.  That uncertainty 
is of value both to the patentee and to the alleged infringer if the patent is in fact 
invalid, because the settlement allows them both privileged access to the 
market.”215   
The lack of independent examination can also be a problem when the 
patentee tries to amend the claims.  Although the interests of the petitioner and 
 
 208 Id. 
 209 Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 687–88 (2004); see also Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives 
to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why 
Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 968 (2004). 
 210 Miller, supra note 9, at 687–88. 
 211 Id. 
 212 See, e.g., Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144. 
 213 In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d at 211. 
 214 Mark R. Patterson, Leveraging Information About Patents: Settlements, Portfolios, and Holdups, 50 
HOUS. L. REV. 483, 497–98 (2012). 
 215 Id. 
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the public are usually aligned when it comes to invalidating the issued claims, 
they may not be similarly aligned with respect to opposing proposed amended 
claims.216  For instance, patent owners may narrow their claims such that 
petitioners are no longer at risk of infringement.217  Even if the amended claims 
do not impact the petitioners, however, they can still be asserted against 
subsequent infringers.   
The PTO recognized the challenge of protecting the public against potentially 
invalid claims without the ability to independently evaluate validity.  As the PTO 
explained: 
The Board does not conduct a prior art search to evaluate the 
patentability of the proposed substitute claims, and any such 
requirement would be impractical given the statutory structure 
of AIA proceedings.  If a motion to amend is granted, the 
substitute claims become part of an issued patent, without any 
further examination by the Office. 218 
To resolve this conundrum, the PTO tried to shoehorn claim amendments 
into the adjudicative structure of AIA reviews by requiring patent owners to 
prove patentability.219  Under the PTO’s initial approach, patentees seeking to 
amend their claims in an AIA Review must explain why their claims are 
patentable over the prior art of record.220  This rule “account[s] for the absence 
of an independent examination by the Office where a prior art search is 
performed as would be done during prosecution of a patent application, 
reexamination, or reissue.”221  In other words, the PTO tried to make up for the 
examiner’s absence by forcing patent owners to show why their proposed claims 
are valid. 
Despite the PTO’s rationale for placing the burden of proof on patent 
owners, the Federal Circuit ultimately held that it was improper to do so in Aqua 
Products v. Matal.222  This decision largely turned on whether the PTO’s rule 
 
 216 See International Flavors & Fragrances Inc. v. United States, IPR2013-00124, 2014 WL 
2120542 (PTAB May 20, 2014) (granting unopposed motion to amend claims). 
 217 Aqua Prod., 872 F.3d at 1349 (“[I]f no petitioner opposes a motion to amend, or the 
opposition is inadequate in the Board’s view, the record may not contain readily available prior 
art or arguments that were immaterial to the issued claims but that would render the substitute 
claims unpatentable.”). 
 218 2016 Rule Amendments, supra note 21, at 18754. 
 219 See Idle Free Sys., Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., No. IPR2012-00027, 2013 WL 5947697, at *4 
(P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013); MasterImage 3D, Inc. v. Reald Inc., No. IPR2015-00040, 2015 WL 
4383224, at *2–4 (P.T.A.B. July 15, 2015). 
 220 Id. 
 221 2016 Rule Amendments, supra note 21, at 18754. 
 222 Aqua Prods., 872 F.3d at 1296. 
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should receive Chevron deference.223  However, the Federal Circuit also expressed 
concerns about the difficulty of amending claims under the PTO’s approach, and 
how it seems inconsistent with the Board’s looser standard on claim 
construction.224  The court’s lead opinion, for example, noted that “the PTO has 
more than once acknowledged that use of the broadest reasonable interpretation 
standard is only appropriate when patent owners have the opportunity to 
amend,” and yet “[t]he PTO’s statistics confirm that patent owners have 
consistently failed to obtain their requested relief on motions to amend.”225  With 
respect to the prospect of unexamined claims, the lead opinion observed that 
[T]he ‘worst’ possible outcome is that a patent issues in which 
the previously-examined claims have been narrowed and 
clarified in such a way that the petitioner does not fear its ability 
to continue to make, use, or sell its own product, and the public 
is put on notice of exactly how to innovate around those claims 
in the future.226   
The court also noted that amended claims will only issue where “the PTO 
will have been unable to conclude that any issued amended claims are 
unpatentable under very relaxed standards—preponderance of the evidence and 
broadest reasonable interpretation.”227 
Aqua Products made AIA Reviews more in line with adjudications, but the 
decision did little to address issues associated with the Board’s inability to 
examine claims.  The lead opinion noted that unexamined claims should not 
create significant problems because claims can only be narrowed during AIA 
Reviews.228  But just because a claim is narrowed, does not mean it becomes valid.  
Unless the proposed claims are scrutinized for validity, the patentee could narrow 
the claim enough to avoid the challenger’s product or prior art reference, but still 
keep the claim broad enough to cover other competitor’s products.  In a sense, 
those other competitors are silent participants to the PTO’s proceedings because 
their right to make or use their products will likely be affected by the outcome.229  
To the extent AIA Reviews serve a public protection function, the PTO should 
consider their interests as well.  Moreover, although the PTO applies a lower 
“preponderance of the evidence” standard on invalidity, this still assumes there 
 
 223 Id. at 1327–28. 
 224 Id. at 1300. 
 225 Id. at 1299-1300. 
 226 Id. at 1315. 
 227 Id. 
 228 Id. at 1314. 
 229 Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1009 (describing the public as a silent participant in 
post-grant proceedings). 
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is another party opposing the amended claims.  If the petitioner stops 
participating, who is left to introduce any evidence of invalidity, much less meet 
the preponderance of the evidence standard?  In this scenario, the Board must 
independently examine the proposed claims, thus taking on a role that it is poorly 
suited to perform.   
In the PTO’s guidance on motions to amend after Aqua Products, the Chief 
Administrative Patent Judge instructed the Board that, so long as a motion to 
amend is technically compliant, then “the Board will proceed to determine 
whether the substitute claims are unpatentable by a preponderance of the 
evidence based on the entirety of the record, including any opposition made by 
the petitioner.”230  However, it is unclear if the Board would supplement the 
record or introduce new arguments if there is no opposition by the petitioner.  
Judge Taranto’s opinion in Aqua suggest the Board might have broad authority 
to “sua sponte introduce evidence or arguments into the record—and rely on 
them after giving notice and opportunity to be heard.”231  But as discussed above, 
the problem goes beyond the Board’s statutory authority to introduce evidence 
or arguments.  Rather, the Board’s ability to examine claims is also limited by the 
procedural and institutional structure of AIA Reviews.   
B.  ESTOPPEL EFFECTS OF AIA REVIEWS 
The AIA’s estoppel provisions also undermine the examinational function of 
AIA Reviews by creating disincentives for filing early validity challenges, which 
is a key feature of post-grant proceedings that distinguishes them from district 
court litigation.232  Under 35 U.S.C. § 315(e), petitioners are estopped from 
raising invalidity defenses in litigation that it “raised or reasonably could have 
raised” in a previous AIA Review that reached a final written decision.233  And 
they are precluded from petitioning for AIA Review altogether if they have 
previously filed a declaratory judgment of invalidity in district court.234  These 
estoppel provisions prevent parties from re-litigating the same issues through 
multiple AIA reviews or across different forums.235 
If AIA reviews are viewed as a replacement for litigation, then it makes sense 
to broadly prohibit parties from challenging the same patent multiple times.  The 
finality of judgments “encourages reliance on judicial decisions, bars vexatious 
 
 230 David P. Ruschke, Guidance on Motions to Amend in view of Aqua Products, USPTO (Nov. 
21, 2017), https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/guidance_on_motions_to_amend_11_2017.pdf. 
 231 872 F.3d at 1322 n.7 (2018). 
 232 See supra Part III.A. 
 233 35 U.S.C. § 315(c). 
 234 Id. § 315(a). 
 235 Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 814 F.3d 1309, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2016) 
(Newman, J., dissenting) (citing 154 CONG. REC. S9989 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 2008) (statement 
by Sen. Kyl)). 
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litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other disputes.”236  Moreover, the 
legislative history of the AIA suggests the law was intended to “[f]orce a party to 
bring all of [its] claims in one forum . . . and therefore to eliminate the need to 
press any claims in other fora.”237  Without estoppel, parties could mount 
separate validity challenges and wipe out any efficiencies or cost savings of 
administrative patent review.   
By contrast, broad estoppel for post-grant proceedings will inevitably deter 
some parties from challenging dubious patents.238  This means patents that might 
otherwise be cancelled will instead remain uncontested.  Another downside is 
that estoppel provisions discourage parties from challenging patents through 
PGR, since it may be difficult to “discover a potentially invalid patent and to file 
a review on all possible grounds within nine months.”239  The risk of estoppel, 
coupled with the limited time period for filing PGRs, pushes parties to rely on 
IPRs because they are available throughout the life of the patent.240  Most IPRs 
are initiated only when there is already imminent or pending litigation over the 
challenged patents.241  This is noteworthy because post-grant proceedings are 
based on the understanding that improperly granted patents adversely affect 
competition even if they are never litigated.242  It would defeat this feature of 
AIA Reviews if such proceedings are only used concurrently with litigation.   
The PTO’s experience with inter partes reexamination provides a stark 
example of how broad estoppel can undermine the effectiveness of post-grant 
proceedings.  Initially, ex parte reexaminations did not permit third party 
participation, but also did not preclude third-party requestors from asserting 
invalidity in subsequent litigation.243  Later, Congress created inter partes 
reexaminations to allow the third-party requestor to participate in the 
proceedings.244  But as a trade-off, inter partes reexaminations broadly prohibited 
third-party requestors from asserting in litigation the “invalidity of any claim 
 
 236 Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979). 
 237 Synopsys, 814 F.3d at 1332 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
 238 Matal, supra note 58, at 617. 
 239 Susan J. Marsnik, Will the America Invents Act Post-Grant Review Improve the Quality of Patents? 
A Comparison with the European Patent Office Opposition, in THE CHANGING FACE OF U.S. PATENT 
LAW AND ITS IMPACT ON BUSINESS STRATEGY 201–02 (Daniel R. Choy & Lynda J. Oswald 
eds., 2013). 
 240 Jeffrey A. Miller et al., Post-Grant Review: A Promising New Tool for Invalidating Patents?, 
Arnold & Porter (Jan. 18, 2017), https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2017/01/post-
grant-review-a-promising. 
 241 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 69. 
 242 Leslie, supra note 24, at 104. 
 243 In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[D]enial of a request for reexamination 
does not deprive the requestor (if not the patent owner) ‘of any legal right’ to contest validity 
in subsequent court proceedings.”). 
 244 American Inventor’s Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 (1999). 
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finally determined to be valid and patentable on any ground which the third-party 
requester raised or could have raised during the inter partes reexamination 
proceedings.”245  The general consensus is this provision was too draconian and 
over-deterred parties from seeking inter partes reexamination.246  For example, the 
PTO projected that it would receive 600 requests within the first five years of 
inter partes reexaminations.247  Instead, it received only fifty-three requests.248 
Because inter partes reexamination failed to weed out bad patents, Congress 
narrowed the scope of estoppel for AIA Reviews to promote wider use of these 
proceedings.249  Rather than precluding all arguments the petitioner “could have 
raised,” the AIA added the term “reasonably.”250  During Senate debates, Senator 
Kyl explained how this language “softens the could-have-raised estoppel that is 
applied by inter partes review against subsequent civil litigation.’ ”251  He noted 
that “[a]dding the modifier ‘reasonably’ ensures that could-have-raised estoppel 
extends only to that prior art which a skilled searcher conducting a diligent search 
reasonably could have been expected to discover.”252  This language prevents 
courts from precluding litigants from raising any issue that was “physically 
possible to raise in the inter partes reexamination, even if only a scorched-earth 
search around the world would have uncovered the prior art in question.”253  
Accordingly, the AIA’s approach represented a middle ground between inter 
partes reexamination’s broad estoppel provisions and proposals to limit estoppel 
only to issues actually raised and decided by the Board.254 
Despite this legislative compromise, the scope of estoppel still remains a 
contentious issue.  For example, patent owners often point to “follow-on” IPR 
petitions as evidence that the AIA estoppel is inadequate.255  Because § 315(e) 
only applies to IPRs that “result[ ] in a final written decision,” there is no estoppel 
if the challenger petitions for review, but is denied institution.256  Accordingly, 
some petitioners file “follow-on petitions” if their earlier petition is denied or 
partially instituted.  Around 21% of all petitions can be categorized as “follow-
 
 245 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (emphasis added). 
 246 Vishnubhakat, supra note 64, at 346. 
 247 See Report to Congress on Inter Partes Reexamination at 4, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexamreport.pdf (last visited Aug. 
1, 2017). 
 248 Id. 
 249 Matal, supra note 58, at 618. 
 250 35 U.S.C. § 315(e) (emphasis added). 
 251 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
 252 Id. 
 253 Id. 
 254 Matal, supra note 58, at 616–17. 
 255 Steve Brachmann, Three rounds of IPR petitions invalidates VirnetX patent after Apple gets around 
statute of limitations, IPWATCHDOG (Nov. 16, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/11/ 
16/ipr-petitions-virnetx-patent-apple-statute-of-limitations/id=90233/. 
 256 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). 
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on” because they are filed after the preliminary reply or the institution decision.257  
The PTO has recognized that, in some instances, such petitions are used to 
harass patent owners, and can “frustrate the purpose” of AIA Reviews as “quick 
and cost effective alternatives to litigation.”258  To address this issue, the PTAB 
established a multi-factor test to determine whether the Board should exercise 
its discretion to deny institution without reaching the merits.259  The Supreme 
Court’s recent decision in  SAS v. ComplementSoft will also curtail the practice of 
follow-on petitions.  In that case, the Court held that the Board must institute 
review on an all-or-nothing basis and eliminated partial institutions.260  This 
forces the PTO to incorporate all challenged claims in the final written decision, 
and make all of them subject to estoppel. 261 
In other respects, however, the AIA’s estoppel provisions still over-deter 
parties from seeking review, particularly within the nine-month window for 
PGR.  The statutory estoppel provisions for PGR and IPR are the same, and 
both prohibit the petitioner from making any arguments “that the petitioner 
raised or reasonably could have raised” before the Board.262  But whereas IPR 
petitioners are limited to arguments based on prior art printed publications or 
patents, PGR petitioners can essentially raise any invalidity argument available in 
district court.263  Therefore, there are more grounds that a petitioner “reasonably 
could have raised” in PGR than IPR, and the former likely has a broader estoppel 
effect even though the statutory language is the same.264  Given its potential for 
broad estoppel, patent practitioners have urged caution before seeking PGRs.265  
The PTO’s statistics likewise indicate that parties rarely invoke PGR.  By the end 
of 2017, there have only been eighty-six PGR petitions.266  Because PGRs are 
only available for patents with an effective filing date after March 2013, the PTO 
 
 257 Chat with the Chief: An Analysis of Multiple Petitions in AIA Trials at 14, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Chat_with_the_Chief_Boardside_C
hat_Multiple_Petition_Study_20171024.pdf. (last visited Jan. 28, 2018). 
 258 Hamilton Beach Brands, Inc. v. F’Real Foods, LLC, IPR2017-00765, 2017 WL 3268945, 
at *3 (July 31, 2017) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 112–98, pt.1, at 48 (2011)). 
 259 General Plastic Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Canon Kabushiki Kaisha, Case No. IPR2016-01357, 
Paper 19 (Sep. 6, 2017) (listing seven-factor test). 
 260 SAS Inst., Inc. v. Iancu, 138 S. Ct. 1348, 1354 (2018) 
 261 Id. 
 262 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1). 
 263 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) 
 264 Miller et al., supra note 240 (“Because PGRs have significantly more draconian estoppel 
possibilities, potential petitioners should consider whether they should wait out the nine 
month window for filing a PGR petition and instead file either an IPR petition or, if available, 
a CBM petition.”). 
 265 Id. 
 266 2017 TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 3. 
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has only recently started issuing patents that qualify for this proceeding.267  But 
even accounting for this fact, less than 0.1% of eligible patents have been 
opposed through PGR.268   
This result seems contrary to the policy behind PGRs. If anything, the 
estoppel provisions for PGR should be narrower than IPR.  AIA reviews aim to 
protect the public from invalid patents and create certainty in patent rights.269  
Both objectives are better served if validity challenges are raised early in the life 
of the patent.  As the former Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination 
Policy explained, “[t]hird parties should be encouraged to test patent claims as 
early as possible after issuance, when patent holders have invested the least 
resources and the opportunity for third parties to change course in the market is 
greatest.”270  He also noted how a “first window” of nine months to two years 
was important because “[s]ubsequent to this period, the likelihood that the patent 
owner would be practicing the invention more widely and that third parties might 
perform potentially infringing activities leads to a heightened need to protect 
patent owners against potentially harassing conduct.”271  More recently, this issue 
was raised during the Supreme Court arguments in Oil States.272  Justice Breyer, 
for example, was concerned about situations where a company has invested 
billions to develop a patented concept, only to have its patent invalidated at the 
PTO.273  Such losses could be avoided if patent validity and scope were settled 
soon after issuance.  Aside from providing certainty, early challenges to validity 
also benefit the public by cutting off the competition distorting effects of 
improperly granted patents.  Indeed, it matters little to the public if an improperly 
granted patent is challenged shortly before it expires, since any associated 
economic and social costs will have already been incurred.   
Given the benefits of early resolution, it would make sense to incentivize 
PGR over IPR.  But contrary to this policy goal, imposing broader estoppel for 
PGR encourages petitioners to delay challenging issued patents.274  Recent 
statistics suggest that AIA reviews are not particularly effective for resolving 
patent rights early, but are used primarily as an alternative forum for litigation.275  
 
 267 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 6 (f)(2)(A). 
 268 In 2016, the PTO granted approximately 300,000 utility patents, and roughly 40% of all 
issued patents qualified for PGR.  Dennis Crouch, AIA Patents: Now Most Issued Patents are AIA 
Patents, PATENTLYO (July 18, 2017), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2017/07/patents-most-
issued.html. 
 269 See supra Part II.A. 
 270 Stephen G. Kunin & Anton W. Fetting, The Metamorphosis of Inter Partes Reexamination, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 976 (2004). 
 271 Id. 
 272 Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-32, Oil States, No. 16-712 (U.S. Nov. 27, 2017), https:/ 
/www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-712_7kh7.pdf. 
 273 Id. at 29. 
 274 Marsnik, supra note 239, at 201–02. 
 275 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 69. 
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One 2016 study found that around 86.8% of IPR and CBMR involved patents 
that were concurrently litigated in court.276  In some cases, the petitioner may 
not have filed an early petition because they were not aware of the patent until 
they received a demand letter or complaint.  Or there may be many patents and 
claims covering the same product, and the petitioner could not determine which 
claims the patentee intended to assert until litigation.  But regardless, because 
post-grant proceedings are used predominately when there is concurrent 
litigation, the AIA has probably failed to promote early resolution of patent 
validity or claim scope. 
Interestingly, Congress was aware of the downsides for imposing broad 
estoppel on PGRs and sought to avoid these results.  Initially, the estoppel 
provisions for both IPR and PGR were limited to the grounds actually raised and 
decided.277  To prevent repetitive challenges throughout the life of the patent, 
Congress broadened the estoppel provision for IPR to include the “reasonably 
could have raised” language.  However, this amendment was never supposed to 
be added to the PGR estoppel provision.278  Senator Kyl noted that 
“[c]hallengers who use [PGR] will be estopped in litigation from raising only those 
issues that were raised and decided in the post-grant review, rather than all issues that could 
have been raised, the standard employed in inter partes reexamination.”279  And 
yet, the final version of the AIA included the “reasonably could have raised” 
language in the PGR estoppel provisions as well, which was likely the result of a 
scrivener’s error.280 
IV.  COMPARISON WITH THE EUROPEAN MODEL 
Thus far, this Article has focused on post-grant proceedings in the U.S., and 
has identified two issues that undercut the PTO’s examinational function in AIA 
reviews.  To understand how an alternative model for post-grant proceedings 
might impact the balance between the examinational and adjudicative functions, 
this Section looks to oppositions at the European Patent Office (EPO).  Like the 
PTO, the EPO also provides a “first window” to challenge the validity of recently 
 
 276 Id. 
 277 Matal, supra note 58, at 617–18. 
 278 Brent Kendall, Scrivener’s Error Undercuts Patent-Law Overhaul, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2013), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/scrivener8217s-error-undercuts-patentlaw-overhaul-
1382917120 (“The bill’s supporters said they didn’t immediately notice the change, which was 
later attributed to a scrivener’s error.  The final wording ‘is widely recognized’ as a mistake, 
Teresa Stanek Rea, deputy director of the Patent Office, said in a speech last week.”). 
 279 Senate Debate 157 CONG. REC. S1360–S1394 (emphasis added). 
 280 Kendall, supra note 280. 
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issued patents.281  Since the 1980s, third-parties could challenge a European 
patent within nine months of issuance through an opposition proceeding.282  
With around 5% of all European patents challenged, opposition proceedings 
have long been an important part of the patent system in Europe.283  And in 
drafting the AIA, Congress emulated certain aspects of European oppositions, 
including the nine-month “first window” to challenge patents.284 
At first glance, PGRs appear very similar to EPO opposition proceedings.  
Both are only available nine months after issuance, allow for written and oral 
arguments, and provide an opportunity to amend the claims.285  A closer look, 
however, reveals key differences between the U.S. and European approaches to 
post-grant proceedings.  For one, parties in Europe have stronger incentives to 
file an opposition shortly after issuance.286  If a party forgoes opposition, the 
only other avenue to challenge validity is through the national courts, which is a 
process that is comparably more expensive and unpredictable.287  By contrast, 
U.S. litigants can challenge issued patents more than nine months after issuance 
through IPRs, and do not have to choose between centralized administrative 
revocation and a patchwork of national court proceedings.288  Moreover, EPO 
oppositions have no estoppel effect, and petitioners can still present the full 
range of invalidity arguments in subsequent litigation.289  The result is that “first 
window” validity challenges like oppositions proceedings are widely-used in 
Europe, but rarely invoked in the U.S. 290 
This section looks at administrative patent reviews in Europe, and compares 
the role of the EPO to that of the PTO.  It starts by providing a brief overview 
of European opposition proceedings.  This section then examines the possible 
benefits of making some aspects of AIA Reviews more like European 
oppositions.  In particular, the PTO could conduct PGRs in a more 
examinational manner, while focusing on the litigation replacement function of 
IPR.  For PGRs, this would mean narrowing the estoppel provisions and 
 
 281 David Lewin, EPO Oppositions Are Affordable, Powerful and Increasingly Important, 
253 MANAGING INTELL. PROP. 44, 49 (2015); Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1006. 
 282 Convention on the Grant of European Patents, Oct. 5, 1973, art. 99 [hereinafter 
European Patent Convention]. 
 283 Lewin, supra note 281, at 45; Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1006. 
 284 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 47–48 (2011). 
 285 Marsnik, supra note 239, at 189. 
 286 Leythem Wall & Hazel Ford, 7 Reasons Revocation in EU Could be As Popular as IPR 
in U.S., LAW360 (Apr. 25, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/775865/7-
reasons-revocation-in-eu-could-be-as-popular-as-ipr-in-us. 
 287 Id. 
 288 35 U.S.C. § 282 (establishing invalidity as defense in district court infringement 
proceedings); id. at 311 (allowing parties other than the patent owner to challenge validity 
through IPR). 
 289 Lewin, supra note 281, at 47. 
 290 Id.; Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1003; see supra Part III.B. 
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bolstering the Board’s ability to examine claims.  IPR would retain broad estoppel 
provisions, but otherwise mimic district court litigation more closely by giving 
patents a presumption of validity and applying a narrower claim construction 
standard.  In principle, this should encourage petitioners to request PGR more 
often, and allow PTO to take on a more examinational role for these “first 
window” validity reviews.   
A.  POST-GRANT PROCEEDINGS IN EUROPE 
European opposition proceedings are administered by the EPO, an agency 
created in part to harmonize patent law in Europe.291  Despite the existence of a 
common market for goods and services, patent rights in Europe are still enforced 
through national courts.292  This fragmented approach creates various problems.  
Procuring patents in each state is cumbersome and adds significant costs to 
obtaining patent rights across Europe.293  The lack of a single patent regime 
makes patent enforcement and revocation more challenging because national 
courts often have inconsistent standards and procedures.294  To address this 
problem, various states adopted the European Patent Convention (EPC) to 
provide for centralized examination and processing of European Patents 
through the EPO.295  A European Patent, however, still needs to be validated in 
each state’s national patent office before it will have legal effect in that state.296  
This process remains expensive, with one estimate placing the cost for obtaining 
enforceable patent rights in all countries subject to the European Patent 
Convention at fifteen times the cost of obtaining a U.S. patent.297   
The EPC also allows parties to request cancellation of a European Patent 
through an centralized opposition proceeding at the EPO.298  Procedurally, any 
person except the patentee may file a notice of opposition within nine months 
of the notice of issuance.299  After the initial notice of opposition, the opposing 
party remains part of the opposition proceedings and may be invited to file 
 
 291 Kevin P. Mahne, A Unitary Patent and Unified Patent Court for the European Union: An Analysis 
of Europe’s Long Standing Attempt to Create a Supranational Patent System, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 162, 173–74 (2012). 
 292 Id. at 167. 
 293 Gaurav Jit Singh, Unified European Front: The Road Towards a European Unitary Patent 5 (E.U. 
Centre in Singapore, Working Paper No. 21, 2014), http://aei.pitt.edu/63494/1/WP21-
European-Unitary-Patent.pdf. 
 294 Mahne, supra note 291, at 168–69. 
 295 European Patent Convention, supra note 282, art. 99. 
 296 Mahne, supra note 291 at 167. 
 297 Id. at 168. 
 298 European Patent Convention, supra note 282, at art. 99. 
 299 Id. 
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written responses to support invalidity.300  The opposing party can also argue at 
an oral hearing.301  Once the EPO renders a decision, it becomes legally effective 
in every country designated on the European patent.302   
Compared with AIA Reviews, oppositions are far more examinational.  As 
the EPO has explained, oppositions are “not essentially contentious” and the 
deciding body does not have to be neutral.303  For instance, the EPO “shall not 
be restricted . . . to the facts, evidence and arguments provided by the parties,” 
and “shall examine the facts of its own motion.”304  Thus, rather than acting as 
an unbiased adjudicator, the EPO procedures seem more focused on ensuring 
that issued patents are not overly broad or otherwise invalid.305  And consistent 
with this role, the EPO generally does not allow parties to jointly terminate an 
opposition proceeding through settlement.306  Once the EPO becomes aware of 
potentially invalidating prior art, the agency can proceed independently to 
invalidate the patent, even if the opposing party requests termination.307  
Moreover, opposition proceedings do not have any estoppel effect.308  Thus, the 
opposing party remains free to raise invalidity defenses in subsequent litigation.  
An unsuccessful opponent can “use the same facts, the same evidence, and the 
same arguments that he used during the European opposition procedure in the 
national procedure.”309   
Consistent with its examinational policy goals, the EPO also applies fairly 
liberal standards for claim amendments in opposition proceedings.  Patentees 
can simultaneously submit multiple sets of proposed amended claims.310  The 
patentee typically files a main request, along with multiple auxiliary requests that 
include narrower sets of proposed claims.311  Some patent owners will file more 
than ten auxiliary requests to help ensure their patent survives review in some 
amended form.312  The EPO considers each request individually, and will allow 
 
 300 Id. at art. 101. 
 301 Id. at art. 116. 
 302 Lewin, supra note 281, at 44–45. 
 303 Heli Pihlajamaa, Opposition and Appeal Proceedings at the European Patent Office, 
European Patent Office, AIPLA at 3 (Oct. 22, 2015),  
http://www.aipla.org/committees/committee_pages/IP-Practice-in-
Europe/Committee%20Documents/AIPLAOppositionAppeal2210.pdf. 
 304 European Patent Convention, supra note 282, art. 114. 
 305 Id. art. 114(1); Pihlajamaa, supra note 303, at 3. 
 306 Marsnik, supra note 239, at 189–90. 
 307 Id. 
 308 De Corte et al., supra note 29, at 113. 
 309 Id. 
 310 Jennifer Turchyn, Improving Patent Quality Through Post-Grant Claim Amendments: A 
Comparison of European Opposition Proceedings and U.S. Post-Grant Proceedings, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
1497, 1512 (2016). 
 311 Id. at 1511-12. 
 312 Id. at 1512. 
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the broadest claims requested in view of the cited prior art.313  The statistics for 
European opposition confirm that the EPO tends to allow more claim 
amendments.  Overall, about one third of all opposed patents are allowed in 
some amended form.314   
Once the nine-month period for opposition expires, however, a party seeking 
to challenge a European Patent can only do so through the national courts.315  
Not only is mounting separate challenges through the national courts expensive, 
but it can also result in inconsistent decisions between various courts regarding 
the same invention.316  As such, there have been various attempts to create a 
supranational patent court to handle both enforcement and revocation.317  
Indeed, the EPC itself was meant to be one of several steps towards creating a 
full European Community Patent enforceable across member states.318  After 
years of extensive negotiations, however, national government opposition 
ultimately scuttled plans for the European Community Patent.319   
Despite these setbacks, the European Commission has renewed its effort to 
create a supranational patent regime.  In February 2013, twenty-five member 
states signed an agreement to create a Unified Patent Court (UPC).320  When and 
if the UPC goes into effect, it will serve as a single forum for patent enforcement 
and revocation for the newly created Unitary Patent, which will have legal effect 
across member states.321  In some respects, the UPC seems akin to U.S. district 
courts because it decides both infringement and validity.322  But unlike district 
courts, the UPC will be staffed in part by technically trained patent judges.323  
The UPC will also allow independent revocation actions, and permit the patentee 
to amend its claims during such proceedings.324   
 
 313 Id. 
 314 Wall & Ford, supra note 286; Turchyn, supra note 310, at 1501. 
 315 Wall & Ford, supra note 286. 
 316 Id. 
 317 Mahne, supra note 291, at 169–80 (describing various attempts to create a supranational 
patent court in Europe). 
 318 Singh, supra note 293, at 6–7; Mahne, supra note 291, at 175–76. 
 319 Paul Meller, Fresh Opposition to Europe Patent Plan, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/24/business/worldbusiness/24patent.html. 
 320 Agreement on a Unified Patent Court, 2013 O.J. (C 175) 1 [hereinafter UPC Agreement]; 
About the Unified Patent Court, UNIFIED PATENT COURT, https://www.unified-patent-
court.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2018). 
 321 Mahne, supra note 291, at 183–88. 
 322 Unified Patent Court, EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, https://www.epo.org/law-
practice/unitary/upc.html#tab1 (last visited Aug. 23, 2018). 
 323 UPC Agreement, supra note 323, arts. 8, 15. 
 324 PRELIMINARY SET OF PROVISIONS FOR THE RULES OF PROCEDURE (“RULES”) OF THE 
UNIFIED PATENT COURT R. 30, 42 (18th draft, October 19, 2015), https://www.unified-
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With the framework for the UPC in place, some contend that “Europe is the 
closest it has been since the mid-1970’s to establishing an EU-wide supranational 
patent system.”325  Nevertheless, several hurdles still remain to making the UPC 
a reality.  The UPC agreement requires ratification by thirteen member states, 
which must include the three countries with “the highest number of European 
patents” in 2012.326  These are the U.K., Germany, and France.327  Despite its 
decision to leave the European Union, the U.K. ultimately ratified the UPC 
Agreement in April 2018.328  German ratification, however, has been put on hold 
pending a constitutional challenge against UPC ratification in the German 
Constitutional Court.329 
B.  LESSONS FROM OPPOSITION PROCEEDINGS 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to acknowledge that EPO oppositions 
are far from perfect.  Oppositions are much slower than PGRs and IPRs.  If the 
appeal period is included, oppositions can take four to eight years to reach a final 
determination.330  So even after a European Patent issues, patentees and 
competitors can go for years without certainty as to whether the claims will 
ultimately be upheld.  This can be especially problematic for innovative products 
with short life cycles, such as mobile devices or software.331  As one law firm 
noted, “[d]elays of four to six years while the EPO decides whether a patent is 
valid are not commercially viable” for some industries.332  Likewise, others 
observe that competitors often use opposition proceedings to harass patent 
 
patent-court.org/file/134/download?token=kBosxprv (hereinafter “Preliminary UPC 
Procedural Rules”) 
 325 Mahne, supra note 291, at 183. 
 326 UPC Agreement, supra note 323, art. 89. 
 327 Benjamin Beck & Ulrich Worm, German Parliament Approves Ratification of the UPC 
Agreement, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=c2ba2b7c-d552-4fa9-
b694-11a15ce05246. 
 328 Olga Bezzubova et al., Two Down, One to Go: The UK Ratifies Unified Patent Court Agreement, 
LEXOLOGY (May 1, 2018), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=bc7c7618-ee64-
47cf-b458-5ce9bf01659a; Peter Hale, Does the UK Government’s Brexit plans bode well for the UPC?, 
LEXOLOGY (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=811b3073-
1ec2-467b-85bc-ac684dbb9402. 
 329 Joachim Fledges & Michael Krenz, UPC ratification process in Germany put on hold Following 
Constitutional Complaint, LEXOLOGY (Sept. 11, 2017),  
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ff06e540-b288-4660-b809-07aa6521f899. 
 330 Radcliffe, supra note 31; Early Certainty at the EPO- Our Perspective, Kilburn & Strode LLP,  
http://www.kilburnstrode.com/assets/articles%20&%20briefing%20notes/Early%20certai
nty%20-%20our%20perspective.pdf (last visited August, 29, 2018). 
 331 Early Certainty at the EPO, supra note 330. 
 332 Radcliffe, supra note 31. 
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owners by filing a notice of opposition at the very end of the nine-month period, 
which creates a longer period of uncertainty for patentees.333 
Despite these drawbacks, opposition proceedings have been successful in at 
least one respect, which is promoting a high number of challenges to patent 
validity within nine months of issuance.  Studies show that oppositions have a 
“screening” effect that weeds out bad patents early and improves the overall 
quality of European Patents.334  Within the past five years, around five percent 
of all European Patents have been opposed.335  At first glance, reviewing five 
percent of issued patents may not seem like it would have a meaningful impact 
on overall patent quality.  However, studies show that oppositions are more likely 
to be directed against patents that are economically valuable and likely to be 
litigated.336  Those patents also present the greatest risk of improperly tying up 
important technologies and causing welfare loss if their scope is too broad.337  
Thus, opposition proceedings identify patents that are most likely to impact the 
economy and subject those to additional scrutiny.338  So although only five 
percent of issued patents are challenged, scholars have found that oppositions 
have a comparably greater impact on overall patent quality in Europe.339   
Compared with EPO oppositions, none of the various forms of 
administrative patent review in the U.S. have been nearly as successful.340  In the 
thirty-year period from 1981 to 2011, the PTO granted an average of around 
120,000 patents annually.341  Yet the PTO received, on average, only around 380 
requests for ex parte reexamination per year.342  Likewise, very few parties 
 
 333 Pernille W. Gojkovic & Claus Elmeros, Oppositions at the European Patent Office- A Cruel 
Tool…, HØIBERG (June 2015), https://hoiberg.com/om-hoeiberg/artikler/oppositions-at-
the-european-patent-office-a-cruel-tool/. 
 334 Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patent before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business 
Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 611–15 (1999); Hall & Harhoff, 
supra note 32, at 1002–07; Marsnik, supra note 239, at 187 (“Oppositions serve a positive 
screening function of weeding out a substantial number of bad patents and narrowing a 
substantial number that are too broad.”). 
 335 Lewin, supra note 281, at 45; Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1006. 
 336 Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1006; Marsnik, supra note 241, at 186–87. 
 337 Vishnubhakat, supra note 64, at 337; Lemley, supra note 62, at 6–8. 
 338 Michael A. Carrier, Post-Grant Opposition: A Proposal and a Comparison to the America Invents 
Act, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 117 (2011). 
 339 Merges, supra note 334, at 611–15; Hall & Harhoff, supra note 32, at 1002–07; Marsnik, 
supra note 241, at 187. 
 340 Carrier, supra note 338, at 112–15. 
 341 U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART, USPTO, https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ 
ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm (last updated June 16, 2016). 
 342 Carrier, supra note 338, at 113; Farrell & Merges, supra note 209, at 966 (“The original 
reexamination system has been at best a modest success.  Although it is an imperfect measure, 
it is striking that less than 1% of issued U.S. patents are ever challenged by a reexamination 
request.”). 
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requested inter partes reexamination, which was widely considered a failure.343  
Nor are there any indications that PGRs will be used more frequently.  By the 
end of 2017, there have only been 86 petitions for PGRs.344  Although IPRs are 
used more frequently, they are primarily used concurrently with litigation, which 
does little to advance the policy goal of reducing the competition skewing effect 
of invalid patents before they are litigated.345 
Congress and the PTO could take several steps to create stronger incentives 
for parties to file PGR petitions.  As discussed above, EPO oppositions do not 
have any estoppel effects on subsequent litigation.346  In theory, Congress could 
follow suit and eliminate the estoppel provision for PGRs.  Considering the 
patent owner industry groups’ concerns about the use of post-grant proceedings 
to harass patent owners, eliminating estoppel altogether for PGR may not be  
politically feasible.347  A more realistic fix would be to narrow the estoppel 
provision for PGRs to only the grounds actually raised in the petition.  Indeed, 
the legislative history of the AIA indicates that Congress never intended PGRs 
to broadly preclude subsequent validity challenges.348  Rather, the PGR estoppel 
provision seems to have been an unintentional import from the IPR statute.349  
By removing the phrase “reasonably could have raised” for PGR, Congress 
would make clear that petitioners are only estopped from re-litigating the specific 
grounds for invalidity raised in their petition.  Thus, if an unsuccessful PGR 
petitioner later discovers a written description problem or a new anticipatory 
reference that it missed during the initial nine-month window, the petitioner 
would not be foreclosed from mounting those invalidity defenses in litigation.   
Although narrowing estoppel will inevitably raise fears of harassment, the 
limited time window for filing PGR petitions should mitigate such concerns.  
Even in its current form, the PGR estoppel provision does not prevent multiple 
PGR petitions.  PGRs take eighteen months to complete after the petition is 
filed, so the nine-month window for PGR would close before the Board can 
reach a final written decision.350  Instead, PGR estoppel only applies to 
 
 343 Report to Congress on Inter Partes Reexamination, USPTO, 
https://www.immagic.com/eLibrary/Archives/General/US_PTO/Po41217R.pdf (last 
visited August, 29, 2018); Vishnubhakat, supra note 64, at 346. 
 344 2017 TRIAL STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 3. 
 345 Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making, supra note 19, at 70 (“[V]alidity challenges in 
the USPTO are, indeed, connected with the threat or fact of infringement litigation, for a large 
majority of challenged patents are also asserted in court…  Our data indicate that patents 
challenged in the PTAB are, on average, also asserted at least three times in court.”). 
 346 De Corte et al., supra note 29, at 113. 
 347 Matal, supra note 58, at 616 (“In the case of inter partes review, many patent owners 
objected to repealing could-have-raised estoppel, arguing that such a change would result in 
‘duplicative administrative and judicial challenges.’”). 
 348 Id. at 617–18. 
 349 Id.; Kendall, supra note 278. 
 350 35 U.S.C. §§ 324, 326. 
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subsequent IPRs, CBMs, or litigation.  Each of those proceedings has their own 
means of preventing repeat validity challenges by the same party.351  In other 
words, even if PGRs had no estoppel effect at all, the petitioner would still have 
only one subsequent bite at the apple before triggering some form of estoppel.  
In fact, the PTO could even eliminate the possibility of “follow-on” petitions for 
PGRs if it waits until the nine-month period expires before requesting a patent 
owner preliminary response or issuing an institution decision.  That way, by the 
time the PTO issues an institution decision, the window for filing a PGR would 
have already closed.  Although this practice will delay the final written decision, 
it would also prevent petitioners from filing “follow-on” petitions within the 
PGR period. 
Narrowing PGR estoppel is a necessary, but likely insufficient, step towards 
shifting validity disputes earlier in the life of a patent.  The more difficult question 
is how to encourage parties to challenge patents soon after issuance, not just how 
to remove disincentives.  Opposition proceedings are popular in Europe in large 
part because parties must resort to expensive and unpredictable national court 
proceedings after the nine-month window closes.352  Of course, it is neither 
feasible nor desirable to emulate this aspect of the European system.  
Nevertheless, parties are more likely to challenge patents early if there are 
disadvantages to delay.  In fact, during the drafting of the AIA, one of the 
arguments against a “life-of-the-patent” proceeding, like IPR, was that “if review 
could be sought later when a defendant is sued, big businesses would lose the 
incentive to challenge bad patents early in their life, and, as a result, ‘the public 
will face the consequences of living with an invalid patent for years and 
years.’ ”353   
One solution might be to model PGRs after European opposition 
proceedings, but make IPRs more similar to the proposed UPC revocation 
procedures.  In theory, the UPC should create a centralized enforcement and 
revocation system in Europe, which means that parties will no longer have to 
choose between opposition or separate challenges in national courts.  
Nevertheless, there are still compelling reasons for parties to use oppositions 
 
 351 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315, 325.  Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 315.  
Unlike IPRs and PGRs, CBMR estoppel only reaches the grounds that were actually raised, 
and does not include grounds that “reasonably could have been raised.”  Id. 
 352 Wall & Ford, supra note 287. 
 353 Matal, supra note 58, at 603 (quoting Patent Reform Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 1908 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Prop., 110th Cong. 56 (2007) 
(statement of Gary Griswold, President and Chief IP Counsel, 3M Innovative Properties Co., 
on behalf of the Coalition for 21st Century Patent Reform)). 
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instead of relying on UPC revocations.354  The UPC draft rules suggest that 
revocation proceedings will be costlier and more adjudicative in nature.355  The 
standard for amending claims at the UPC is likely to be far more stringent than 
in EPO opposition proceedings.  The draft rules only allow the patentee to 
submit one application to amend the patent, and any subsequent requests to 
amend can only be entered with leave of court.356  Further, the application to 
amend must also explain “why the proposed amended claims are valid,”357 which 
seems similar to the PTO’s pre-Aqua standard for claim amendment in AIA 
Reviews.   
The PTO could take a similar approach by applying adjudicative standards 
for IPRs, including a presumption of validity and the district court claim 
construction standard, while retaining the broader examinational standards for 
PGRs.  In principle, this would make patents harder to invalidate in IPR and 
would push more parties to request PGR.  Logically, it seems reasonable for the 
Board and district courts to apply consistent standards for invalidity.  Given that 
over eighty percent of IPR and CBMR involved patents that are concurrently 
litigated in court,358  IPRs might be better characterized as part of litigation than 
a redo of patent examination.  Raising the invalidity standards for IPRs also gives 
patent owners greater certainty in their patent rights.  As Justice Breyer noted in 
Oil States, there is a concern that the current AIA regime allows challenges to 
issued patents after patent owners have made significant investments in their 
inventions.359  Although this also happens when district courts invalidate patents, 
IPRs can be more problematic because of the lower burden of proof and broader 
claim construction.  Under Director Iancu, the PTO has already taken steps to 
make IPRs more adjudicative by proposing to use the district court standard for 
claim construction instead of the broadest reasonable interpretation. 
If the PTO adopts district court standards for IPRs, this would provide a 
stronger justification for a strict approach to motions to amend.  As discussed in 
Section III, the Board’s ability to independently examine claims is limited, so the 
PTO initially placed the burden of proof for validity on patent owners to prevent 
unexamined claims from issuing.360  However, recent experience shows how this 
 
 354 See, e.g., Thorstein Bausch, EPO Opposition vs. UPC Revocation at 47–48, EPLIT 
Annual Meeting (Apr. 15, 2016), http://www.eplit.eu/files/downloads/AGM%202016/ 
Bausch%20-%20EPO%20Opposition%20vs.%20UPC%20Nullity%20Action.pdf. 
 355 Unified Patent Court: Counterclaims for Revocation, Crowell & Moring LLP (Dec. 1, 
2015), https://www.crowell.com/NewsEvents/AlertsNewsletters/all/Unified-Patent-Court-
Counterclaims-for-Revocation. 
 356 Preliminary UPC Procedural Rules, supra note 324, at R. 30. 
 357 Id. 
 358 Vishnubhakat et al., supra note 19, at 69; Sameni, supra note 184. 
 359 Transcript of Oral Argument at 29-32, Oil States, No. 16-712 (U.S. argued Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2017/16-
712_879d.pdf. 
 360 See supra Part III.A.2. 
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practice can result in denial for the vast majority of motions to amend.361  This 
is problematic because, as one critic of IPRs noted, “[t]he reality for Patent 
Owners is that their opponents get the benefit of significantly lower standards 
than in district court litigation, but Patent Owners do not get the corresponding 
benefit of an ability to amend their claims in response to the unpatentability 
assertions.”362  By making the standards for IPR more adjudicative and 
consistent with district court litigation, opponents would no longer benefit from 
broader claim construction or lower validity standards.  Accordingly, the PTO 
could maintain a strict standard for motions to amend without skewing IPR 
proceedings in favor of petitioners.   
V.  CONCLUSION 
The first five years of the America Invents Act (AIA) has revealed basic 
disagreements about the function of post-grant proceedings, particularly with 
respect to the institutional role of the PTO.  Many contend that such proceedings 
have essentially become an alternative for district court litigation with lower 
standards for validity.  This Article identified two aspects of AIA Reviews that 
undercut their examinational function: the failure to incentivize early resolution 
of patent validity and the PTO’s limited capacity to independently examine 
claims in AIA Reviews. 
EPO oppositions, however, demonstrate that post-grant proceedings can 
have adjudicative procedures but still screen out dubious patents early.  This is 
partially attributable to the unique position of opposition proceedings in the 
European patent system, since there are currently no alternatives for resolving 
validity through a centralized proceeding.  With the coming of the UPC, one 
topic for future inquiry is whether parties continue to file oppositions at the same 
rate even after UPC revocation proceedings become available.  Indeed, some 
have already suggested that parties may take a “watch and wait” approach to 
challenging validity after the UPC.363  Regardless, EPO oppositions provide a 
useful contrast to AIA Reviews, and offer guidance on how the PTO can use 
administrative patent reviews to better protect the public from overbroad patents 
and promote certainty in patent rights. 
 
 
 361 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 362 Lewis & Irving, supra note 20, at 65. 
 363 Stephanie Pilkington & Ling Zhuang, EPO opposition reforms: the changing face of central patent 
revocation, LIFE SCI. INTELL. PROP. REV. (July 28, 2016), https:// www.lifesciencesipreview.com   
/contributed-article/epo-opposition-reforms-the-changing-face-of-central-patent-
revocation. 
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